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Abstract
This thesis consists of three essays attempting to determine the key determinants of
spending-saving behaviour and financial stability of Canadian households from both
micro and macro economics.
In the first chapter, we try to isolate and evaluate the socio-economic character-
istics of households who accumulate debt by spending more than what they earn in
a given year. In particular, with a focus on the right tail of spending distribution
–households who tend to spend a larger fraction of their income– we use multivariate
regression type analysis to isolate socio-economic factors that contribute to debt ac-
cumulation and lead to insolvency. We aim to highlight the micro level factors that
have contributed to the increase in the proportion of spender households in the pop-
ulation. Specifically, what are the marginal effects of age, income level, education,
and family structure on the probability of a given households spends more than its
income?
Related to this question, we also consider the effect of budget allocation decisions
on the probability of spending more than income and accumulating debt. We find
that budget share of specific items in household consumption basket, has important
information about the spending-saving behaviour of a household. Our analysis pro-
vides valuable information about what goods and services are the main outlays of
expenditure for households in severe debt.
The second chapter is about evaluating the relationship between household’s sav-
ing rate and its long-run income from a more technical perspective. This chapter
is an attempt to address the possible endogeneity issue present in this relationship.
In addition to the conventional and widely exercised methodology, three alternative
approaches are considered, and in a Monte Carlo experiment, the performance of
four approaches is tested in three different environments. Results of our analysis
show that the conventional methodology outperforms only when there is a simple
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linear type of endogeneity in the model. However, when more complicated types
of endogeneity are present, it fails to predict saving rate unbiasedly. In the end,
using FAMEX and SHS datasets from Canada, we re-evaluate the question with all
different methods. Our empirical analysis suggests that more aﬄuent households do
save a larger fraction of their income, and the results are consistent across different
years not sensitive to different instruments.
Finally, the third chapter looks at the household financial stability from a macroe-
conomic perspective. Using aggregate data, at the provincial level, on households
insolvency rate, we try to point out important aggregate key factors in determin-
ing financial instability of households. In a series of panel regression analysis, we
explore the effect of aggregate variables such as GPD, unemployment rate, housing
prices, interest rate, and household debt level, on the insolvency rate of households.
Moreover, in a panel vector autoregressive estimation, we attempt to investigate the
interactive effects and consequences of insolvency rate and gross domestic product,
while controlling for other related aggregate variables. The key finding is that higher
levels of household debt are associated with higher insolvency rate, and insolvency
rate has a negative impact on GDP.
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Chapter 1
Household Spending and
Consumer Debt in Canada
1
1.1 Introduction
Since the beginning of the “Great Moderation” in which the US economy gained a
significant reduction in the variance of its GDP, consumers have overstretched them-
selves with spending and debt accumulation. From a global perspective, the US
economy is not an exception and high national debt, in which consumer debt holds
an outstanding share, has risen in most major economies. The case of Canada is an
exception in comparison since it started in a more favourable situation in the early
1980s, but dropped steeply and currently stands in a worse situation.
The personal saving rate in Canada declined from about 19% in the early 1980s to
less than 2% in 2005, and after small fluctuations, it was less than 4% in last quarter
of 2014. In aggregate terms, household debt increased in Canada from $363 billion
in 1990 to about $1 trillion in 2005 and $1.8 trillion in 2014 (6 fold in comparison
to 1990).1 Consumer spending and debt have been investigated extensively in the
US, starting as early as the 1990s. However, for Canada, it has become a matter of
importance in recent years as the level of household debt is approaching the same
level as the US before the major recession in 2008.
While private consumption is an important factor in growing and stimulating the
economy, accumulating debt in this sector increases the vulnerability of the house-
hold section, and the whole economy in general. In the case of an adverse income
shock, with high levels of accumulated debt, the possibility of going to recession is
higher and recovering from such recession would take longer. Accordingly, the faster
growth of debt compared to disposable income has raised concerns. Consequently,
policy-wise it is imperative to evaluate and monitor the relative effects of contribut-
ing factors to overspending and debt accumulation.
Moreover, the budget allocation among households who are accumulating debt
has important policy implications. Whether a debt is created from spending on
1CANSIM table 378-0122.
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daycare expenses, university tuition and health care costs have different policy im-
plications than if a debt is created upon expensive vacations and other recreational
activities. In this study, we attempt to isolate and evaluate the socio-economic de-
terminants of households who spend more than their income and accumulate debt in
a given year. We also consider the effect of the budget share of specific items in the
overall budget of households on the probability of a household spending more than
its earnings.
Age and income level are considered as the most important determinants of sav-
ing/spending decisions. With a focus on the right tail of spending distribution –who
spend more than their income– we use multivariate regression type analysis to isolate
socio-economic factors that contribute to debt accumulation and lead to insolvency.
We aim to highlight the micro level factors that have contributed to the increase in
the proportion of spender households in the population. Specifically, what are the
marginal effects of age, income level, education, and family structure? Related to
this, what are the differences in debt levels across age, income level, education, and
family structure? And perhaps most importantly, what goods and services are the
main outlays of expenditure for households in severe debt?
Our econometric estimates reveal interesting features of spending behaviour that,
to the best of our knowledge, have not been widely documented. For example, house-
holds that spend more income than they report –constituting more than 30% of the
population– devote a greater portion of their expenditures to mortgage and rent,
recreation expenditures and private transport relative to other households. They
also allocate a proportionately smaller amount on pension and insurance payments
as well as to personal taxes relative to households that spend what they earn. Fur-
ther, household income is the most significant predictor of whether a household is in
debt. Interestingly, neither marital nor household type dummy variables are consis-
tently significant.
The rest of this article is structured as follows. The next section, extensively re-
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views previous related studies. Section.1.3, explains the Survey of Household Spend-
ing, that is used as the main sample in this study. Section.1.4 provides a general
analysis of spending behaviour along the distribution of Canadian households. Sec-
tion.1.5 presents empirical results and concluding remarks are provided in Section.1.6.
1.2 Literature Review
Globally, extant literature has grown around the issue of declined personal saving
rate and the increased amount of household debt. Researchers have been trying to
address the issue from different aspects such as; (i) The heterogeneity of accumulated
debt among different groups of households with different socio-demographic charac-
teristics, trying to link the high amount of debt to specific groups of households.
(ii) The causes and factors behind the declined in saving rate, also its effects and
consequences from micro and macro economic perspectives. (iii) Sources and uses of
household debt. In other words, it has been investigated that how much of household
debt is backed up with houses and properties and how much unsecured debt is car-
ried by households, while some others consider the composition of household debt,
whether borrowed funds are invested in home equity, education and other types of
investment, or they are used to finance consumption.
1.2.1 Heterogeneity in Household Debt
Many researchers have attempted to depict the distribution of households as it relates
to saving and debt accumulation and explain the heterogeneity behind the aggregate
trends. Some studies tried to find a potential relationship between certain household
characteristics and the amount of debt carried. A household’s socio-economic char-
acteristics such as age, income, dwelling status and geographic location have been
examined to try and answer “what type of households are more likely to save less
and accumulate debt?”. It would have significantly different policy implications if
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all household types are saving less proportionately rather than when certain groups
of households do so.
For example, Allen and Damar (2012) using the administrative data of household
bankruptcy data in Canada and show that bankrupt individuals in Canada are more
likely to be unemployed, and are typically renters. A large percentage of Canadians
do not owe any mortgage debt but instead maintain bank loans and credit cards
from several different creditors.
Performing multivariate regression analysis, Hurst (2011) shows that even after
controlling for income, age, and other socio-economic factors, family type has ex-
planatory power. Results from Hurst (2011) show that the highest debt-to-income
ratio belongs to younger families, and single parents have the highest debt-to-asset
ratio, being more likely to hold a higher debt-service ratio. Couples without children
and single individuals are also more likely to have higher debt-to-income ratios than
couples with children. On the other hand, family type is not associated with debt-
to-asset ratio and debt service ratio of above 40%.
Hurst (2011) also tests for a gap between Canadian-born residents and immi-
grants. He finds that after controlling for income, education and geographic location,
immigrants have significantly higher debt-service ratio compared to people born in
Canada.
Chawla and Uppal (2012) provides more detailed information about demographic
features and spending patterns of Canadian households. They show that the likeli-
hood of and the amount of debt is higher among younger home-owners, young families
with children, the higher-educated, and those with high incomes. This study shows
that individuals who are 40 years old and under carry 60% of household debt in
Canada, and almost half of the household debt belongs to couples with young chil-
dren. By assessing the distribution of household debt, they find that debt is more
equally distributed among better-educated households and households with higher
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income. Conversely, debt distribution is substantially unequal among less-educated,
unattached individuals and renters.
In another study Chawla (2011) investigates the distribution of mortgage debt
among Canadian households and examine the financial burden of homeowners by
estimation of mortgage-liability ratio as the share of mortgage payments in house-
hold disposable income. He shows the proportion of households who devote at least
20% of their disposable income on mortgage payments has increased faster among
younger households.
Faruqui (2008) uses 1999 to 2007 waves of the Canadian Financial Monitor to
examine the financial vulnerability of Canadian households. He evaluates the dis-
tribution of debt-service burden among Canadian households, and shows that from
1999 to 2007 the proportion of households in the lower tail of DSR distribution had
decreased. His findings imply that the growth in debt-to-income ratio has been larger
among upper quantiles of income rather than lower-income families. He concludes
that “despite the increase in the debt-to-income ratio since the late 1990s, house-
holds remain well positioned to manage their increased debt levels”. By doing a
cross country comparison between US and Canadian households, based on micro-
data analysis, he finds that Canadians were standing at a better financial position
in 2004 than US households.
Simone (2014) analyzes household debt from a different perspective. He explores
household debt distribution in neighbourhood scale within Canada’s major cities,
in order to investigate the role of house prices and neighbourhood composition on
the rising levels of household debt. He also tries to relate these factors to the level
of indebtedness among immigrants and racialized neighbourhoods to see if concen-
trations of immigrants and visible minorities are associated with higher debt, after
controlling for other demographic factors.
In Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver, Simone (2014) finds higher levels of indebt-
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edness for suburban regions relative to central regions. He also determines a positive
relationship between credit card debt and other consumer debts and proportion of
visible minorities and immigrants. A significant trend is depicted in Simone (2014)
that neighbourhoods concentrating Chinese in each of the three global cities present
higher levels of credit card debt and other consumer debts, while neighbourhoods
with Blacks and Latin Americans have lower total household debt levels. He also
shows a negative relationship between proportion of seniors and renter households
in neighbourhoods and the debt to disposable income ratio in that neighbourhood.
Walks (2013) also provides a cross-sectional mapping of the geography of house-
hold debt in Canada’s major cities. Consistent with Simone (2014), he finds that the
amount of debt is lower in smaller and slower-growing cities, while more dominated
by unsecured forms of consumer debt. Also neighbourhoods housing younger fami-
lies revealing higher debt loads. However Walks (2013) does not find any significant
evidence supporting that concentration of immigrants in the global cities is a factor
pushing up debt levels.
In a Bank of Canada discussion paper, Meh et al. (2009) uses Canadian Finan-
cial Security survey from 1999 to 2005 to investigate different measures of debt as
debt to asset and debt to income ratios at different quantiles of income and wealth
distribution. They identify an increasing trend in debt to income ratio at the lower
end of income distribution that are more vulnerable to interest rate increases and
negative income shocks. This is in contrast to the findings of Faruqui (2008). Meh
et al. (2009) also provide evidence that shows households balance sheets are more
sensitive to housing prices relative to past, as mortgage payments are taking up a
larger share of household budget.
In another study Chawla and Wannell (2005) use two waves of the Family Ex-
penditure Survey to compare the patterns of saving and spending between two years
of 1982 and 2001. They categorize households into two groups; spenders and savers,
that are characterized as those who spend more than their reported income and those
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who spend less than their reported income, respectively. Using summary statistics,
they compare the two groups at two time periods and evaluate micro factors con-
tributing to the declining saving rate in Canada.
For example, they find that on average, spender households actually spent more
than saver households in 1982, even though they made about 28% less on average. In
2001, as the income gap rose to 35% between the two groups, the average expenditure
of saver households exceeds that of spenders. They also investigate the composition
of two household types in terms of income and other demographic variables, e.g.,
“in 1982, 57% of all households with incomes under $20,000 were spenders compared
with 16% of those with incomes of $100,000 and over. By 2001, the proportions had
risen to 66% and 23%, respectively.”
The most striking finding of Chawla and Wannell (2005) is that, on average,
spender households spend more than savers even in absolute dollars, respectively
$39,000 vs. $33,900 in 1982, and $41,700 spent by spender households vs $37,900
spent by savers in 2001. They show that car purchases contribute the most in this
regard.
Burbidge and Davies (1994) is an early and widely cited study that uses Canadian
survey data to examine the age profile of income, consumption, saving and holding of
wealth. They use the Family Expenditure Survey and Survey of Consumer Finances,
and employ a “Kernel-Smoothed Quantiles” technique to estimate a smoothed distri-
bution for saving over the life cycle. They show that saving rate peaks at age 45 and
increases across higher quantiles of income. They also estimate an age distribution
for all other indicators such as income, consumption and different measures of saving.
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1.2.2 Sources and Uses of Household Debt
It is of primary importance to know how much of household debt is secured by prop-
erties and equities, and how much unsecured debt is carried by different groups of
households. Also the evolution of this ratio holds valuable information.
Bailliu et al. (2012) use 1999 to 2010 waves of Canadian Financial Monitor sur-
vey data to examine the sources and uses of household borrowing. They categorize
household debt into three categories of: i) unsecured consumer debt flows, ii) home-
equity extraction (borrowing against equity in existing houses through increases in
mortgage debt and draws on home-equity lines of credit); and iii) mortgage debt
flows associated with the purchase of newly constructed houses. They find that in-
creases in home-secured debt, particularly home-equity extraction, contributed the
largest share to the rise in total household debt in Canada between 1999 and 2010.
Mian and Sufi (2009) use individual-level data on home ownership and defaults
in the United States for the period of 1997 to 2008 and provide evidence that ex-
isting homeowners borrowing against the increase in their house prices stands for a
great portion of increase in the household leverage from 2002 to 2006, and also for
the increase in the number of defaults from 2006 to 2008. Their estimates show a
one standard deviation increase in house prices results in 0.25 standard deviation
increase in the debt to income ratio. They discovered that the average homeowner
borrows 25 to 30 cents for every dollar increase in house prices.
Findings in Mian and Sufi (2009) suggest that borrowed funds against increas-
ing home equity are not used for any new real estate investment or repayments
of credit card balances, but more spending on consumption and home renovations.
They show that younger households, those with low credit scores and households
with high initial credit card usage, are more likely to borrow against increased home
equity. According to Mian and Sufi (2009), and of defaults from 2006 to 2008 origi-
nated from home-equity extraction, standing for 2.8% of GDP.
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Another aspect of Canadian household debt that has not been widely investi-
gated is the uses of household borrowing. Borrowed funds by households can be used
toward different purposes such as purchasing a new home or renovating one, pur-
chasing goods and services, investment and financing current debts. Knowing how
households have used borrowed funds can be profoundly important for estimating
the effects of increase and decrease in the amount of household debt and also in
estimating the effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policies. Whether borrowed funds
are used by households to finance consumer spending or they are invested toward
housing or any type of investment will have significantly different results.
For example, if households use home equity to borrow funds and use them toward
consumption, a decline in house prices reduces their home equity and brings down
their borrowing and spending power.
Bailliu et al. (2012) count five different uses that households’ debt goes: con-
sumption, home renovation, financial investment, non-financial investment and debt
repayment. They analyze these categories for both secured and unsecured sources
of debt. From secured debt flows, they show that 40% of home-equity extraction
is used to finance consumption and home renovation, 34% is used for financial and
non-financial investment and the rest, 26%, is used for debt repayments.
Also the majority of unsecured debt flows (more than 70%) is used toward con-
sumption that has been fairly stable. Debt repayments hold a share of about 14%,
financial investment 6% and home renovations about 5%.
1.2.3 Causes and Consequences of Household Indebtedness
Household debt has been rising at a faster pace relative to disposable income in many
advanced economies as well as in Canada for decades. But it has been accelerated
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since the late 1990s. Several factors may have contributed to this international phe-
nomenon. There have been competing theories from both macro and microeconomic
level points of view, trying to explain causes of the declined personal saving rate and
increasing levels of household debt.
On the other hand, this phenomenon has raised concerns regarding financial
health of households, while many researchers has cast doubt about future economic
growth. Accordingly, numerous studies have investigated the effects and conse-
quences of the phenomenon on different aspects of households’ financial health and
the growth of the economy in general.
Causes
In the late 1980s, after the major decline in the personal saving rate that occurred
in almost all major economies such as US, UK, Japan and as well as Canada, micro
level investigation of the reasons of the decline in saving rate started. Almost all
studies fail to explain the decline in personal saving rate by demographic and micro
level factors, but valuable facts were discovered. The declining trend is universal and
even though dramatic, not sudden. Furthermore, changes in demographic variables
and population structure are very slow and gradual to have any explanatory power.
An early documentation of theories and facts about the decline in saving rate can
be found in Browning and Lusardi (1996). They count eleven potential explanations
for the decline in saving rate in 1980s:
“Changes in the age structure of the population; changes in the sav-
ing propensities of different cohorts; changes in household structure; in-
creased government insurance; changes in the distribution of income; the
decline in aggregate growth; capital gains on housing; capital gains on
stocks; the increased annuitization of wealth; cash payouts by firms to
shareholders; and the development of financial markets”
In the following a selection of these hypotheses are discussed.
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Ageing Population
In the Life Cycle Model framework, elderly are supposed to not save and cut down
assets, accordingly if the proportion of elderly people increases in the population.
When the baby-boomer generation reaches their 60s, aggregate saving rate should
fall. The above proposition can be questioned from two different aspects. i) Is the
population truly aging? And ,is the movement in age profile of population have
enough variation that have any explanatory power?, ii) Assuming that population is
actually getting older, does saving rate vary significantly across age groups?
Sabelhaus et al. (1991) provide evidence from US Consumer Expenditure Surveys
and show that movements in demographics have a modest contribution (if any at
all) in the decline in saving rate. They specifically show that saving rate has de-
creased among all age groups. They show that calculating saving rate in 1983, while
keeping the age profile the same as 1973, would result in an increase of only about 1%.
For the case of Canada in particular, Burbidge and Davies (1994) explicitly re-
mark that “continued saving after retirement is more the rule than the exception
and saving rate does not decrease among elderly people” in Canada. They use waves
of Survey of Family Expenditure and show that saving rate changes more by income
level than by age.
In a more recent study, Crawford and Faruqui (2012) consider the other side
of the issue, which is the amount of debt households carry in different stages of
life. As a consequence of an aging population, they show that in 1999 a households
with older heads hold lower levels of debt compared to 2010. As a counter-fact
for 2010, in the absence of population aging –keeping age distribution the same as
in 1999, they find a similar distribution of debt for both years. This is while the
proportion of older households has increased and older population tends to hold less
debt. They explain that population aging phenomenon has a moderating effect on
household indebtedness but it is offset by other aggregate factors. Crawford and
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Faruqui (2012) finds that mean of debt level has increased for all age groups from
1999 to 2010 that suggests a systematic change in the environment of cohorts.
“For example, while a typical household aged 31 to 35 years in 1999
(i.e., born between 1964 and 1968) had total real debt of approximately
$75,000, a representative household in the same age range in 2010 (i.e.,
born between 1975 and 1979) had a mean real debt of almost $120,000”.
Gokhale et al. (2009) consider three other factors besides age profile; (i) cohort
specific effects, (ii) ratio of available resources to output in each age group and (iii)
the ratio of total resources to output. Using the US Consumer Expenditure Surveys,
they documented main factors of the decline in saving rate as; redistribution of in-
come from current and future young generations to current old generation; and a
sharp decrease in the propensity to consume among elderly. Comparing early 1960s
to late 1980s, they show that elderly people have access to more resources relative
to younger people and have dramatically higher propensity to consume.
There are few potential explanations in the literature for the lower saving rate
or higher amount of debt that more recent cohorts are carrying relative to 1980s
and early 1990s. First, shifts in the underlying preferences in favour of current con-
sumption relative to future consumption. The cohort that saw the Great Depression
and then the World War in their childhood learned that debt is a sin and saving is
virtuous. Cross (2015) explains the etymology of debt in European languages roots
to words such as “Fault”, “Sin” and “Guilt”.
On the other hand, the cohort who was raised in the post-war period, witnessed
strong economic growth and prosperity. They had a different view toward current
and future consumption and debt was significantly more accessible to them. Con-
sequently, more recent generations have a higher demand for credit due to higher
expectations of future income. Lower interest rates play an enhancing role while new
financial innovations play the easing role to provide higher and easier access to credit
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for households.
Rise in Income Inequality
It is believed that income inequality –larger income growth in higher quantiles of
income distribution– pushed people in the middle class to consume more and save
less. After the seminal work of Piketty and Saez (2001) about the issue of income
inequality in the United States, a vast literature base was established to further in-
vestigate the consequences of this increased inequality on the economy. One of these
consequences is the phenomenon known as “Trickle-Down Consumption”, “Conspic-
uous Consumption” or the phenomenon of “Status Seeking” among middle or lower
income households. This phenomenon is motivated when income and consump-
tion rises at the top of income distribution significantly faster than lower quantiles,
induces households in lower quantiles of income to devote a larger share of their
budget to consumption, which is often luxury-oriented, in order to signal a higher
socio-economic status.
Another twist in the income distribution that has potential contribution in the
decline in saving rate, is the conventional notion that higher quantiles of distribution
save a larger proportion of their income. Usually this is taken as a basic princi-
ple, especially by non-economists. However, economists have been skeptical to this
proposition and literature is very inconclusive. If households in higher quantiles of
income save a larger proportion of their income, with increase in their share of in-
come in household sector, aggregate household saving rate must rise, in other words,
a lower saving rate must be the consequence of lower inequality.2
Bertrand and Morse (2012) explore the household level data to find evidence in
favour of “Trickle-Down Consumption” and test the hypothesis of whether the in-
creased income inequality in the last three decades is related to declined saving rate
2See Browning and Lusardi (1996).
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that happened in the same timeframe. They use the panel of Consumer Expenditure
Survey (CEX) and Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) from the US to exploit
state-year variation in income and consumption of the top quantiles of income dis-
tribution to find supporting evidence for their hypothesis.
They regress log consumption of households on the log of average consumption
in 80th quantile of income distribution –rich people– at state-year level, proxied by
the log of average income. Their important finding is that a one percent increase in
consumption of the rich is associated with 0.182 percent increase in the consumption
of households in lower quantiles, holding income constant – the effect is even stronger
among only 20th to 80th percentiles.
Their findings suggest that middle income households that are more exposed to
more aﬄuent people in their market would spend a greater share of income, when
income is held constant. In their framework, they do not find any strong evidence in
favour of traditional theories such as permanent income hypothesis, precautionary
saving and wealth effect.
In their behavioural analysis they suggest that the increased consumption is more
supply driven in the form of luxury goods provided in market that creates the desire
to seek a higher social status through consuming more visible goods.
Moav and Neeman (2012) takes a game theory approach from macro perspective
and develops an overlapping generations model in which households care about their
economic status and signal their unobserved income higher falsely. In particular they
show that if human capital is observable and correlated with income, individuals with
lower human capital in a signalling equilibrium devote a greater share to conspicuous
consumption –goods that are more visible and do not help with increasing human
capital– while more educated people tend to spend less.
In their model, an individual’s utility is a function of his consumption, invest-
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ment in human capital of their offspring and their own socio-economic status. In
this framework, Moav and Neeman (2012) provide an explanation for the increasing
saving rate associated with higher levels of income, at the same time why poverty is
persistent and individuals cannot escape the poverty trap.
Considering the relationship of saving rate and income, the most comprehen-
sive empirical study is provided by Dynan (2004). In this study the hypothesis is
strongly supported that higher permanent income –or life-time income– is associated
with higher saving rate. She uses the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and
estimate saving rate for five quintiles of permanent income proxied by different in-
struments such lagged income and non-durable consumption.
Dynan (2004) show that not only saving rate increases with income, bequest
and precautionary motives for saving are stronger in higher quantiles of households
compared to lower quantiles. This implies increasing slope rather than a constant
correlation between saving rate and income level.
On the other hand, in a more recent study by Alan et al. (2015), they follow Dy-
nan (2004)’s methodology and apply it to Canadian Family Expenditure (FAMEX)
survey data. The striking finding is that saving rate does not increase by permanent
income in Canada, at least for the upper quantiles of income compared to middle
quintiles.
Low Interest Rate and Relatively Lower Cost of Borrowing
Mortgage debt forms about 70% of household debt in Canada. Unlike many OECD
countries, Canada’s mortgage market did not experience a severe downturn in 2008,
and monetary policy worked so well that it became internationally known as a suc-
cessful financial regulation3. Even though mortgage borrowing decreased in many
3See Kiff (2009).
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countries during and after the 2008 recession, the Canadian mortgage market con-
tinued to grow and consequently, the debt-to-disposable-income ratio reached for a
new high year after year, in the winter of 2014 it was 163.3%.4 This is even higher
than what it was in the US and UK when the recession occurred in 2008.
Fortin (2014) is one of few studies that uses aggregate data to estimate a demand
function for mortgage loans market in Canada. He estimates three equations for
three different measures of mortgage debt, i) average real value of new mortgage
loans, ii) number of new mortgage loans and iii) flow of real repayments of existing
loans. The results from this study show that: first, interest rate influences mostly
number of new loans –one percent lower interest rate increases number of mortgage
loans by 13%. Second, house price is the main source of changes in average value
of new loans –one percent increase in house prices, increases the average value of
new mortgage loans by about 8%. Lower inflation – lower real interest rate– also in-
creases household mortgage debt and reduces the rate of repayment of existing loans.
Findings in Fortin (2014) suggest that the stable rise in (real) house prices in
addition to low inflation was the most forceful factor behind the growth of mortgage
debt from 2000 to 2007 in Canada. Following that, sustained low interest rate in-
creased the number of new loans.
Effects and Consequences
Many researchers have tried to investigate the effects and consequences of rising
household debt on general financial health of households in the short run, while some
others consider facts in the long run. Different perspectives on this issue propose dif-
ferent scenarios and have resulted in some disagreements among economists. While
many economists are concerned with the vulnerability of households with respect to
short run negative shocks, others try to highlight benefits of created investments and
wealth in long-run.
4The Daily - National balance sheet and financial flow accounts
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In a Bank of Canada study, Crawford and Faruqui (2012) use Canadian Finan-
cial Monitor survey data in order to investigate the trends in household indebtedness
from both supply and demand perspectives. On the demand side, households enjoy
a smoother consumption, and are able to allow their consumption to be different
from income in different stages of life. Also in the event of a loss in income they can
maintain a more stable consumption when they have access to the credit market.
Finally, it makes them able to borrow and invest in housing, education and other
types of financial and non-financial investments.
On the other hand, while individual households were enjoying the recent financial
innovations in the credit market, the major recession in 2008 showed that excessively
accumulating debt and the relaxed standards of lending is a threat to financial health
of households and makes the economy vulnerable to negative shocks, which highlights
the importance of considering supply factors.
Long-Run
Long-run consequences of rising household debt has been more controversial than
those in the short-run. Some researchers highlight the role of investment and wealth
created through borrowed funds, while others cast doubt about the adequacy of sav-
ings of the baby-boomer generation for their retirement.
Crossan et al. (2014) evaluates financial literacy of Canadian households through
an internationally comparable survey data on financial literacy and retirement plan-
ning. The data is collected through a questionnaire designed to be comparable to
surveys conducted in a number of other countries such as Australia, France, Ger-
many, Italy, Japan, and the United States. It is also investigated what types of
individuals have higher financial knowledge and are planning for retirement. The
survey contains three simple questions about interest rate compounding, inflation
and stock market and risk diversification. 42% percent of respondents answered
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three questions correctly. While it sounds low, in comparison with other countries,
Canadians are doing fairly similar.
Findings from this survey show that Canadians are standing in a better posi-
tion compared to Americans with score of 32%, while they do worse than Germans
who score 52%. Among Canadians, young, old, women, minorities and individuals
with lower education have less financial knowledge. Provincially, individuals in New
Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia and French-speaking individuals in
Quebec have lower scores.
In a research bulletin, Cross (2015) discusses the long-term perspective of house-
hold debt in Canada and tries to provide evidence that Canadian households are
spending more responsibly. He explains that credit is a recent innovation and it is
too early to judge what is the right and optimal growth rate for household debt.
He describes that debt-to-income ratio is as high as in the US but lower than
many other advanced economies. Also the problem with the US debt-to-income ra-
tio was the flawed distribution of debt, not the high ratio. Cross (2015) emphasizes
that the long-term increase in household debt has resulted a much larger gain in
household wealth and assets, uplifting both incomes and consumption. He notes
that the growth of credit has declined to one-third of what it was in the 2008 reces-
sion, even though the interest rate has been at its lowest in the post-recessions period.
Short-Run
The household debt issue became more important than any time, after the economic
recession in 2008. Slow recovery of the US economy after the 2008 recession, raised
more concerns around the levels of household debt. The issue in Canada is not as
serious as in the US, however the declining saving rate trend in Canada has shown a
much steeper slope than the US. Increasing levels of household debt is a prominent
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factor in the possibility of any recession in future, the vulnerability of households
in case of recession and more difficult and longer recovery periods after any future
recession.
Applying panel analysis on debt to income ratio of households in a list of advanced
economies and over the period of major recession in 2008, Bailliu et al. (2012) sug-
gest that household indebtedness constitutes an important source of risk to household
spending. This risk makes households more vulnerable to consequences of economic
downturns in the event of decline in house prices.
They show that countries with the largest increases in both house prices and their
ratios of household debt to income in the decade leading up to the 2008 crisis tended
to experience the largest contractions in consumption during the subsequent reces-
sion. Also countries with high ratios of household debt to income tend to experience
more severe and prolonged recessions.
Mian and Sufi (2011) also use US data to explain the slow recovery of the US
economy from the 2008 recession through the accumulated levels of household debt
that was elevated in the housing boom era. Performing their analysis at county level,
they focus on the two tails of debt-to-income ratio distribution, and show that coun-
ties that raised larger amounts of debt during the housing boom, experienced a much
slower recovery in the post-recession period. In particular, their analysis reveals that,
auto sales in counties with high debt-to-income ratio households began to decline in
early 2006, long before sales began to fall in the low household debt counties. During
the recession, all counties underwent a major decline in auto sales, however, counties
with low debt households, faced a more robust recovery. In contrast, even after the
official end of the recession, counties with high debt level households, stayed involved
in a severe recessionary environment. They conclude by stating that “. . . Our view
is that the depth and length of the current recession relative to previous recessions,
is closely linked to the tremendous rise in household debt that preceded it. This
view is supported by survey evidence that the main worry of businesses is sales, not
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financing.”
Multiple studies use household level data on consumption and credit card debt
to investigate a relationship between household debt and consumption. Ekici and
Dunn (2010) use the Consumer Expenditure Survey and the Ohio Economic Survey
from US to provide evidence on a negative correlation between credit card debt and
consumption. As claimed by Ekici and Dunn (2010) , a $1000 increase in credit card
debt results in almost 2% decrease in quarterly consumption growth of households.
According to their estimations, the relationship is not sensitive to durable and non-
durable consumption.
1.3 Data
Data used in this study are drawn from a famous Canadian survey, the Survey of
Household Spending (SHS), which is a revised version of the older Family Expendi-
ture Survey (FAMEX). This survey is conducted annually by Statistics Canada in
the ten provinces and usually every other year in the territories and offers available
data from 1997 onwards. However, the data are not based on a panel of the same
households over time. SHS collects detailed information on household specific expen-
ditures such as the annual income of household members (from administrative data
files), demographic characteristics of the household, certain dwelling characteristics
(e.g., type, age and tenure) and certain information on household equipment (e.g.,
electronics and communications equipment). Unfortunately, SHS lacks wealth infor-
mation and does not include the specific household assets and liabilities, although it
does record yearly net changes in assets and liabilities.
The coverage rate has been quite high in SHS, above 95% in most years. How-
ever the response rate has declined from about 80% in 1997 to about 65% in 20095.
5See Barrett et al. (2013)
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Cross-section samples in SHS have a stratified, two-stage design. In the first stage,
a sample of geographic areas is selected. Then, from a list of all the dwellings in se-
lected areas –called clusters– a sample of dwellings is chosen. The ample size ranges
between 12000 to 17000 households.
1.4 General Analysis of Spending Behaviour in
Canada
In this section, in order to obtain a better view of the debt accumulation in different
types of Canadian households, we first provide a broader picture of the aggregate
trends obtained from our sample. We do this in two levels, in the first level we
define over-spending groups broadly. More specifically, we divide our sample into
three groups: Spenders, who spend more than 105% of income; Savers who spend
less than 95% of their income; and finally, Balanced-Households, whose expenditure
is equal to their income with a 5% margin of error.
In level two, we break down these categories further for deeper analysis. Specif-
ically, summary statistics are calculated for; (1) households whose consumption is
80% or less than their income; (2) households whose consumption is 50% less than
their income. The motivation is to study differences in consumption between house-
holds who do not spend a significant amount of their income. Similarly, we construct
summary statistics for; (3) households spending more than 110% of their income; (4)
households spending more than 120% of income; and (5) households spending 150%
or more of their income. The aim is to identify substantial differences in consumption
patterns between households with different spending tendencies.
We calculate the income distribution of different spending groups, as well as the
proportion of each spending group at different income levels. At the end of this
section, we use summary statistics to calculate the budget allocation of households
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in different spending categories.
1.4.1 Distribution of Households by Overall Spending
The general distribution of households by their propensity to spend is presented in
Figure.1.1 from 1997 to 2009. The distribution of households is broken into eight
groups by their tendency to spend.
The general picture looks very similar for all survey years; however, if we exam-
ine each spending group, specifically in Figure.1.2, we can see that the proportion
of households with different propensities to consume have different patterns since
1997. Between %34 to %40 of households spend more than %105 of their income
in all survey years. The proportion of households who spend less than %80 of their
total income, decreases slightly, from %14.5 in 1997 to %13 in 2002, and increases
to %22 in 2009.6 On the other hand, the proportion of households who spend more
than %120 of their total income increases, from %17 in 1997 to %25 in 2005, and
decreases again, to %19 in 2009. It worth mentioning that households with an MPC
of greater than %150 make up about %7 of the sample each year, which is not trivial.
Households with an MPC between %110 and %120 have a constant share of %10 in
the distribution. Households who spend more than %95 and less than %110 of their
total income have a monotone decreasing pattern, from %29 to about %20.
Understanding the relative effects of different socio-economic factors on the prob-
ability of falling into either the Spender or Saver category is of key policy importance.
Sample means of key variables are calculated for the whole sample for various cate-
gories of spending, year by year. Once we compare the sample means with respect
to household characteristics, some interesting differences between Saver and Spender
households are revealed. Sample means are very similar across years. The propor-
6The spike in 2006 is due to the fact mentioned earlier: the “Balance Edit” is not applied to
data in this year.
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tion of households spending more than income increases in higher age categories, and
reaches its maximum at category of households with a head of 40-49 years old, then
decreases as the head of household approaches retirement. The group of low income
households that actually made less than 50,000$ in the survey year, had accumulated
the highest level of debt.
In terms of home ownership, less than 30% of Spender households own a dwelling
with no mortgage, while from 30% to 36% possess a dwelling with a mortgage. Com-
paring the proportion of Spender and Saver households reveals that the number of
households owning a dwelling without a mortgage increases quite significantly among
the Saver households. The proportion of households with a head who is younger than
30 years old, is much higher than saver households in the same age group, which is
not surprising. The proportion of households that live in apartments is higher among
the Spender group compared to Saver households.
1.4.2 Income Distribution of Spender Households
Figure.1.3 shows the proportion of different income groups among Spender house-
holds –households who spend more than %105 of their income. Households with less
than $50,000 yearly income form the majority of spender households; among them,
the proportion of those with less than 30,000$ yearly income has declined slightly.
Spender households whose income is between 50,000$ and 75,000$, take up about
20%. The key trend, however, is on the right tail of the income distribution: the
proportion of Spender households with an income above 75,000 has increased. More
specifically, households in debt, with an income that exceeds $100,000 and $150,000,
do not account for more than %12 of the in-debt households at maximum in 2005,
however, they show a constant increase from 1997 to 2009, at an average rate of %4
per year. Considering the magnitude of income and debt in these groups relative to
households with less than $30,000 income, they are not negligible in aggregate terms.
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Figure.1.4 breaks the category of spender households into three spending groups;
i) those who spend between %105 and %110 of their income, ii) as well as households
who spend between %110 and %120 of their reported income, and iii) households
with an MPC of greater than %120. Even though we see some movements in the two
categories of households whose MPC is between %105 and %120 the proportion of
different income categories among households who spend more than %120, has been
quite stable since 1997.
Figure.1.5 shows the flip side of the coin, which is the proportion of in-debt
households in each income category. From 1997 to 2009, between 44.9% to 56.5%
of the households with less than $30,000 income were in debt and have shown a
gradual increase since 1997. The surprising fact is the magnitude and rapid increase
of overspending among more well-off households with an income above $75,000 and
$100,000. The proportion of overspending households in this income bracket, have
increased from 22.2% in 1998 to more than 29.5% in 2008. Moreover, about 35.7%
of the households with income above $100,000 spent more than their income in 2005.
Figure.1.6 shows the proportion of households in debt for all income levels.
1.4.3 Changes in Income and Consumption 1997-2009
Income is widely considered as the main factor that affects the spending trends of
low-income households.
Figure.1.3 shows the trends in the proportion of households in different income
categories (in real terms). The proportion of households with less than $30,000 in-
come has decreased from %34 in 1997 to about %27 in 2009. A reverse trend can be
seen in category of households with income between $100,000 and $150,000, that in-
creases %7 to %13. The proportion of households in categories of %30,000 to $75,000
do not show a significant change and remains around %20 to %24. The share of the
category of highest income households also has increased by more than double, from
%2.4 in 1997 to %5.7 in 2009.
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Figure.1.7 illustrates a better picture of the income distribution. Ten deciles of
income distribution are depicted from 1997 to 2009, and you can see a monotonic
but not equal increase in all quantiles of income. While income has increased %12 in
the first decile, there has been a %23 increase in income in the highest decile. Again
more emphasis must be put on the magnitude of income in higher quantiles of income.
1.4.4 Trends in Specific Items
In this section, summary statistics of a broad variety of items are analyzed. The items
that we study are: Shelter (G001), Personal Taxes (O201), Food (F001), Transport
(K001), Household Operations (H001), Recreational (M101), Personal Insurance and
Pension (O301), Clothing (J001), Health Expenditures (L101), Tobacco and Alcohol
(N101), Household Furnishings and Equipment (I001), and Education (M301) plus
Tuition(M308). Almost all households report positive expenditures with respect to
these items.7
Furthermore, we analyze summary statistics of some sub-category items. One ex-
ample includes the trends such as of relative share of home-made food expenditure,
vs outdoor food expenditure. Another policy wise important item, that is catego-
rized under of Total “Household Operations”, includes childcare expenses that we
specifically analyze its levels and trends. We discuss the movements in rent and
mortgage payments under “Shelter” expenses. Similarly, we analyze main contribu-
tors to group of total “Transport Expenditures” - gasoline expenditure and expenses
on operation of owned and leased vehicles. Operation of owned and leased vehicles
includes: accessories, maintenance of used or lease vehicles, insurance premiums, and
gasoline expenditures.
Personal taxes include: “income taxes paid in the reference year for that year
7The identifiers in the parentheses are the actual codes from the Surveys of Household Spending
in 2009.
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and on income from previous years if applicable. Also included are other personal
taxes (e.g., gift taxes) minus income tax refunds received in the reference year, except
for federal Child Tax Benefits, Goods and Services Tax Credits and Provincial Tax
Credits. These tax credits are included in average household income before taxes”.
Pension funds and insurance payments expenses are included of: “payments for
life insurance, annuities, employment insurance, public and private pension plans,
and similar items”. In this category, further pension contributions are further as-
sessed.
Tuition fee expenditures are also studied in isolation from other education items.
In Figure.1.8 and 1.9, expenditure share of broad categories of household budget
are depicted. From this broad perspective there has been little change in the weights
of different expenditure categories. It is obvious that the mass of the budget (about
60%) is allocated to shelter, personal taxes, food and transportation.
1.4.5 Trends in Item Specific Expenditures by Spending Cat-
egory
We now present the expenditure share of specific items for households in different
spending groups from 1997 to 2009. We categorize households into six spending
groups. Households who spend exactly their income (with %5 margin of error), cat-
egories of Saver households; spending less than 80% and between %80 and %95 of
income, and two categories of spender households; those who spend between 110%
and 120% of their income, and those who spend more than %120 of their income.
Figure.1.10 and 1.11 show trends of expenditure share of specific items in a house-
hold budget from various spending categories. Household Operations includes ex-
penditures on communications, child care, and cleaning supplies, and constitutes
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between 5% to 7% of total expenditures across all households. Total share of house-
hold operation shows a gradual increase about %1 of total expenditure from 1997 to
2009 in all types of households. The interesting point about this category of con-
sumption is that no specific pattern is visible with respect to household spending
categories. Spenders who overspend more than %120 of their income, spend nearly
the same portion of their budget on Household Operation as Saver households who
spend less than %80 of their income. However households who spend what they earn,
and those with MPC between %105 and %110 spend higher portion of their budget
on household operation expenses compare to other households.
Expenditures on education are relatively low and show a declining trend since
2003 for most households, It is the lowest for Saver households. Tuition and fees
however, have had an almost constant share ranging from %0.3 to more than %1 for
different household categories.
Food expenditures are unsurprisingly a significant portion of total expenditure
for all households, ranging from 12% to 16%. Surprisingly households with the high-
est MPC have the smallest food expenditure share -quite stable around %12-, while
other households have a declining share of food expenditure from %16 to less than
%13. Excluding the highest MPC category of households, other categories show a
converging trend in food expenditure share over the time. The highest budget share
for food expenditure differs %3 from the lowest in 1997, and the difference decreases
to %1.2 in 2008.
Figure.1.12 shows that almost all types of households have had a declining share
on homemade food until 2005 and it starts to rise since after. Restaurant food expen-
diture has almost the reverse trend. Spender households have the lowest homemade
food expenditure and the highest share in outdoor food expenditure share. Con-
sidering the weight of homemade food in total food expenditure -around %80-, it
is obvious that the declining trend in total food expenditure share is driven by the
home-made food component.
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As we saw in Figure.1.8, the largest chunk of consumer budget is cut by shelter
expenses. Figure.1.10 gives a better picture of share of shelter expenses in budget of
households with different spending habits. Households with the lowest MPC, devote
%19 of their expenditure to shelter in 1997 and it increases to more than %21 in
2009, while households with a MPC of greater than %110 devote about %24 of their
budget in 2009. The most surprising trend belongs to Spender households with a
MPC more than %120. From year 2000 to 2009, budget share of shelter expenses
increases from %20 -lowest share among spender households - to %24 which is above
all other types of households in 2009. This must be the result of a policy change
that has helped low income households to devote more share to housing expenditures.
Figure.1.13 confirms that a significant portion of shelter expenditures, %50 on
average, consists of mortgage and rent payments. Other shelter related expendi-
tures include repairs and maintenance, condominium charges and property taxes,
homeowner insurance premiums, and water, fuel, and electricity, and traveler ac-
commodation.
Personal taxes have less than %10 of budget share in spender households while
more than %25 in saver households. Since taxes are related to household income
level, it reveals the relationship between spending behavior and income level. Simi-
larly, pension contributions and insurance payments are higher for Savers relative to
Spender households.
Furniture expenditures which consist of all indoor and outdoor furniture and
household appliances, are a relatively small part of overall expenditures and a posi-
tive relationship can be identified between MPC and the Furniture expenditure share.
The higher the MPC, the larger the furniture expenditure share. The same relation-
ship can be seen for transportation, higher MPC households devote larger share of
their budget to transportation expenditures. However, transportation share varies
more between households with different propensity to consume. Saver households
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with a MPC of less than %80, have less than %10 expenditure share on transporta-
tion, while this is about %20 for households who spend more than %120 of their
income.
Furthermore, most of the variation in expenditure share of transportation among
different spending groups is attributable to corresponding differences in private trans-
port expenditures that has about %90 weight in total transportation expenditures
and %8 to %18 of total expenditures. In Figure.1.14, surprisingly we see that higher
propensity to consume is correlated with higher share of private transportation and
lower share of public transportation in total transportation expenditures. The fact
that Spenders households devote a higher budget share to private transportation
can be explained by lower income, however the fact that they spend less on public
transportation could be caused by higher expenditure on flight expenses by Saver
households that may not be significant in the Spenders budget.
Health care expenditures are a limited portion of total expenditures, about %3,
however they show a significant and consistent upward trend over time. It is hard
to recognize any relationship between expenditure share and spending behavior of
household in this category. Health expenditures include household expenses on sup-
plies such as first aid kits, bandages, hearing aids, thermometers, wheelchairs and
other appliances, medicinal and pharmaceutical products, prescription medicines,
physicians’ care, eye-care goods and services, dental services, hospital care, health
insurance premiums, and personal care.
Recreational expenditures consist of a wide range of goods and services that
include: sports equipment, toys and electronic games, computer equipment and sup-
plies, photographic goods and services, recreational vehicles (such as bicycles), home
entertainment equipment and services, admission to movies, live sports events, live
arts, cable-vision and satellite services, sports activities and children’s camps, and
reading materials. While expenditure share shows a growing path for Saver house-
holds, Spender households tend to devote a smaller share to recreational expenses in
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2009 compare to 1997.
Expenditures on tobacco and alcohol constitute from %2 to %3.9 of total expendi-
tures. Spender households incur a slightly higher proportion than saver households,
but no specific pattern is recognizable between expenditure share and spending be-
havior.
Overall, these results indicate that in some categories household from different
spending group have similar patterns. Food, shelter (net of mortgage and rent),
mortgage and rent, private transport, and personal taxes and insurance occupy the
majority of household budget, even though some subtleties are observable. Spender
households, who add up to about 30% of the population, allocate larger share of their
budget to mortgage and rent, recreation expenditures and private transport relative
to other households. Consequently, there would be less room for pension and insur-
ance payments, in addition to personal taxes relative to households in other spending
groups.
1.5 Econometric Estimates
In this section, we draw our attention to identify a relationship between socio-
economic characteristics of households, and the incidence of household consumption
exceeding its income. In particular, we test if any of the observed characteristics can
meaningfully predict the probability of this incident. Toward this end, we implement
the following multivariate regression model to assess the relative effects of marital
status, gender and age group of the head of household, household size, household
total income and the ownership situation of the dwelling in which household resides
in.
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OS = β0 + β1female+ β2married
+ β9age30 + β10age40 + β11age50 + β12age60 + β13age70
+ β3 + INC
50
30 + β4INC
75
50 + β5INC
100
75 + β6INC
150
100 + β7INC
200
150 + β8INC200
+β9HHsize1+β10HHsize2+β11HHsize3+β12HHsize4+β13HHsize5+βHHsize6
+ β14OwnerNoMortgage+ β15Tenant+ β16weeksworked (1.1)
We use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to estimate this simple empirical specifi-
cation . The dependent and all independent variables have the subscript “i” which
refers to the ith observation -household- in the survey data. Most of these variables
are dummy variables.
female is a dummy variable to control any effect for households with female
head. The marriage variable is equal to 1 if the individual is legally married or in
a common law relationship, and 0 otherwise. age dummy variables represent the
age of the respondent and take a value of 1 if the respondent falls in the following
brackets: 30 to 39 years; 40 to 49 years; 50 to 59 years; 60 to 69 years; and 70 years
and up, omitted age category is 20 to 29 years.
Income dummy variables INCji takes value of 1 if the total household income
falls in the interval of (i×1000$ to j×1000$), and 0 otherwise, omitted income cate-
gory is the group of households with less than $30,000. We include dummy variables
for different household sizes between 2 and 3, 4 and 5, and 6 and higher (omitted
category is the households with size of 1).
In order to control for the effect of tenure type, we include dummy variables for
each type. Variable OwnernoMortgage represents households who own a dwelling
while paying off their mortgage and Tenant represents those who are living in a
rented dwelling, the omitted category is households who own a dwelling without
32
mortgage. weeksworked also represents total number of weeks worked by reference
person and its spouse together. Lastly, province dummy variables are employed to
capture, if there is any, unobserved heterogeneity at the province level.
We employ the same approach to estimate the effects of the composition of house-
hold expenditure on the likelihood of consumption exceeding earned income in that
specific year. We perform this for households in different income groups. Toward
this end, share of different items in total expenditure is added to Equation3.1 as
separate explanatory variables. In particular, we estimate the effects of Homemade
Food Expenditure, Outdoor Food Expenditure, Shelter (net of Mortgage and Rent),
Mortgage and Rent; Household Operations, Household Furnishing and Equipment,
Clothing, Car Operations, Gas Expenditures, Reading Materials, Tuition Fees; other
Education expenses, Tobacco products and Alcoholic beverages, Personal Taxes, and
Personal Insurance payments.
1.5.1 The Effects of socio-economic factors on Over5Spending
Tables.2.1 to 2.6, contain OLS estimates for the effect of different household charac-
teristics on the likelihood of household spending more than their income, by different
percentages, 5%, 10% and 20%. For the matter of convenience in comparison across
years, coefficients are depicted in Figure.1.15 to 1.19 and × signs are for coefficients
that are significant at 5% level.
Obtained coefficients of marital status are similar over the sample period and
they are not sensitive to how we define the left-hand side variable. Gender of the
head of household also does not show any significant effect on probability of spending
more than income, regardless of the magnitude of overspending.
The strongest effect, belongs to income dummy variables, they are all statistically
significant with negative signs, that is due to how they are defined in relation with
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omitted category, which is households with less than $30,000 income. The higher
income categories are associated with less likelihood of overspending and the rela-
tive likelihood decreases marginally by 0.4 to 1% from households who overspend
by more than %105 to %110 and %120 of their total income. The interesting re-
sult about income effect is that as time goes on, the marginal effect of moving from
30,000$–50,000$ to next higher income group stays the same around 1%, however,
the marginal effect of moving from 150,000$–200,000$ to next higher income cate-
gory, increases over time from about 0.3% in 1997 to 1.2% in 2009.
Regarding age dummy variables, all categories are compared to households whose
heads are between 20 to 29 years old, the omitted category. While the relative like-
lihood of overspending in middle ages is not consistently significant with respect to
omitted category, it decreases and becomes more significant, with negative sign, as
age increases, meaning that compared to the households with head of household in
its 20’s, older households are less likely to overspend.
Regarding other characteristics of households, it is interesting that having kids
reduces the likelihood of spending more than income, and coefficients are statistically
significant, implying that families with young children are less likely to accumulate
debt, relative to families without kids. On the other hand, the coefficient estimates
of the household size dummies are positive, statistically significant and their value
increase in larger families. Considering the fact that we control for the number
of younger children, positive effect of household size implies that higher number of
adults is associated with higher probability of spending more than earnings.
The effect of number of weeks worked by both respondent and spouse is estimated
consistently significant and negatively associated with a likelihood of spending ex-
ceeding income. The last but not least, with respect to dwelling status, there are
three categories; households who own a dwelling without mortgage, those who own
with mortgage, as well as households who reside in a rented dwelling. The omitted
category is the owners without mortgage. We find that this category is more likely
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to spend more than income, compared to those who own a dwelling with mortgage
and those who do not own any dwelling.
1.5.2 The Effects of The Composition of Household Expen-
diture - By Income
In this section, we examine the effect of the composition of household expenditure
on the likelihood of the incidence that a household spends more than its income.
We perform this analysis for households in different income groups and for different
magnitudes of overspending. In order to avoid collinearity issues, not all variables
employed in previous analysis, are included at this stage, since some of these vari-
ables are highly correlated. Moreover, we are mostly focused on the components of
household expenses.
We find comparable results for all the survey years and with respect to different
magnitudes of overspending. We also find interesting results within varying income
groups. The most common result is the negative impact of Food expenditure, Shelter
Net of Mortgage and Rent, Mortgage and Rent, and the Household Operations co-
variates. The negative sign is interpreted such that, households who devote a higher
share to these categories in their overall expenditure, are less likely to spend more
than their income. This can be explained by substitution effects associated with
other non-essential goods or services that are replaced for the core items. Note that
we are controlling for income level, and all these impacts are occurring within income
groups.
Obtained coefficient of homemade food expenditure is 1.2 to 3 fold larger than
expenditure on food from restaurant, and the difference tends to reduce when mov-
ing to higher income groups. Considering their negative sign, it conveys the fact
that larger share on home-made food is associated with much lower likelihood of
overspending. Tax, Insurance and Pension contributions are all, largely and nega-
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tively related to overspending. Not surprisingly, these findings express the fact that
households that devote higher share to these expenditure categories are less likely to
spend beyond their income.
Other covariates that their larger share in overall expenditure are associated
with lower probability of overspending, are health expenditures, car operations and
tobacco and alcohol expenses. Interestingly, the magnitude of the negative effect,
increases with both magnitude of overspending and income level.
Positive coefficients belong to expenditure on Childcare, Household Equipment
and Furnishings, Education (net of tuition fees) and tuition payment categories.
Childcare expenses are not widely significant and the magnitude varies from year to
year. Expenditure on household equipment and furnishings is significant until 2004
with marginal effects ranging from 0.3 to 1.8, and is more significant in higher levels
of overspending. While share of the tuition payments is significantly related to prob-
ability of overspending, the share of education expenses is not broadly significant.
In general, therefore, it seems that the higher share of core items, such as, home-
made food, mortgage and rent, household operations, tax, pension contributions and
insurance payments possess the largest coefficients - and are all negatively associated
with likelihood of overspending.
1.6 Summary
In this study we used a series of cross-section household survey data, from 1997 to
2009, to investigate the spending distribution of Canadian households and its trend
during the sample period. We employed regression analysis to tie the spending be-
havior to certain household characteristics and their budget allocation decisions.
In order to calculate summary statistics, we performed our analysis in two phases.
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First, we divided households into two general groups of Spenders –those who spend
105% and more beyond their income– and Saver households – that spend less than
95% of their annual income. In the second phase, we break each of these groups into
three subgroups with different propensity to spend. According to summary statis-
tics, a non-trivial portion of the population – between 35% to 39% of the population
belong to spender group, and about 18% of the population spend more than 120%
in excess of their annual income in 2009.
The key finding of our analysis from summary statistics is that there has been a
shift in the income distribution of Spender households from lower income groups to
higher income households from 1997. In particular in 1997, about 70% of Spender
households belonged to the group of households with less than 50,000$ income. While
in 2009, this number reduced to less than 60%. On the other hand, the proportion of
more well off household with income of higher than 100,000$ has increased from less
than 5% in 1997 to about 10% in 2009. Also the proportion of average households
who overspend, with income between 75,000$ to 100,000$, has increased from 8% to
12% in the same period.
More emphasis must be given to this result. While the majority of Spender house-
holds are formed by low income households with less than 50,000$ income, the trend
is in favor of households in higher income groups. Considering higher magnitudes
of overspending –households who spend 110% or 120% more than their income– the
proportion of high income households increases in the population.
By reviewing summary statistics, it becomes apparent that the mass of household
budget is devoted to items such as: Shelter, Personal Taxes, Food and Transportation
–about 60%. Yet there are some subtleties. Relative to Saver households, Spenders
allocate a greater portion of their budget on Mortgage and Rent, Recreation and
Private Transportation. In contrast, budget share of Pension Contributions, Insur-
ance payments as well as Personal Taxes have a smaller budget share in the group
of spender households.
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We used regression analysis to predict the probability of household consumption
exceeding its income –overspending– by two different types of predictors. First we
use socio-economic characteristics of households to estimate the effects of variables
such as; income, age, household structure and dwelling status. Furthermore, we used
the budget share of different items in overall household expenditure to identify the
linkage between budget allocation and debt accumulation.
Our findings show that household total income is the most powerful predictor of
the probability of consumption exceeding income, i.e., higher income groups are less
likely to overspend, compared to low income households. Statistically speaking, size
of household also plays an important role in this regard and larger household size is
associated with higher chance of falling into Spenders category. Gender and marital
status of the head of households were found to be not significant.
The second class of regressions, also provides interesting results. Share of Food
expenditure, Shelter net of Mortgage and Rent, Mortgage and Rent, Household Op-
eration expenses, Taxes, Insurance Payments and Pension Contributions have all
significant negative effect on the probability of household spending more than its in-
come, consistently across all specifications. On the other hand, coefficient estimates
of Childcare, Household Equipment and Furnishings, Education (net of tuition fees)
and tuition payments possess positive signs and express that households that devote
a larger share of their budget to these expenditure categories, are more likely to
spend more than their income.
Overall, our key finding is the paradox that the probability of spending more
than one’s income increases with smaller share of core items such as shelter and
household expenditures, as well as pension and insurance payments. Even though
this can be due to our inability to control for other unobserved factors, there are
alternative explanations. As mentioned above, larger share of core items might be
associated with less room for other non-essential items and force households to have
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a more organized budget allocation plan. In addition, the tendency to spend more
on non-core items is associated with crowding out effects on core items that raise the
possibility of overspending.
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Figure 1.1: Distribution of Households by Propensity to Spend.
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Figure 1.2: Trends in the proportion of different spending groups in samples over
time.
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Figure 1.3: Income Distribution of Spender Households - MPC>105%
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Figure 1.4: Income Distribution of Different Spending Groups
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Figure 1.5: Proportion of Spender Groups at Different Income Levels
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Figure 1.6: Proportion of Spender Groups for All Income Levels
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Figure 1.7: Trends in Deciles of Income
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Figure 1.8: Expenditure Share of Specific Items in Households Budget 1997-2004
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Figure 1.9: Expenditure Share of Specific Items in Households Budget 2005-2009
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Figure 1.10: Expenditure Share of Specific Items in Households Budget
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Figure 1.11: Expenditure Share of Specific Items in Households Budget
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Figure 1.12: Expenditure Share of Specific Items in Households Budget
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Figure 1.13: Expenditure Share of Mortgage plus Rent in total Shelter Expenditures
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Figure 1.14: Expenditure Share of specific items for Households with Different
Propensity to Consume
53
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
−
0.
6
−
0.
4
−
0.
2
0.
0 OverSpending more than 105%
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
−
0.
6
−
0.
4
−
0.
2
0.
0 OverSpending more than 110%
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
−
0.
6
−
0.
4
−
0.
2
0.
0 OverSpending more than 120%
30000$ < income < 50000$
50000$ < income < 75000$
75000 < income < 100000$
100000 < income < 150000$
150000$ < income < 200,000$
200,000$ < income
Figure 1.15: The effect of being a specific income group on the probability of spending
more than income, in comparison with households with less than 30,000$ income. ×
signs indicate if the coefficient is significant at 5% confidence level.
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Figure 1.16: The effect of being a specific age group on the probability of spending
more than income, in comparison with households with head younger than 30 years
old. × signs indicate if the coefficient is significant at 5% confidence level.
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Figure 1.17: The effect of household size on the probability of spending more than
income. × signs indicate if the coefficient is significant at 5% confidence level.
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Figure 1.18: The effect of number of children younger than 4 years old on the proba-
bility of spending more than income, in comparison with households without children
in this age range. × signs indicate if the coefficient is significant at 5% confidence
level.
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Figure 1.19: The effect of dwelling status on the probability of spending more than
income, in comparison with households who are holding mortgage debt.
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Figure 1.20: Top Panel: The effect of head of household being female on spending
more than income by 5% or more, in different income groups. Middle Panel: The
effect of head of household being married on the probability of spending more than
income by 5% or more in different income groups. Bottom panel: The effect of
number of weeks worked full-time and part-time on spending more than income by
5% or more in different income groups. × signs show if the coefficient is significant
at 5% level.
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Figure 1.21: The effect of being different age groups on the probability of spending
more than income by 5% or more, in comparison to households whose heads are
younger than 30 years old. × signs show if the coefficient is significant at 5% level.
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Figure 1.22: Top Two Panels: The effect of being different age groups on the prob-
ability of spending more than income by 5% or more, in comparison to households
whose heads are younger than 30 years old. Bottom Panel: The effect of having a
child less than four years old, on spending more than income by more than 5% in
comparison with households without any child in that age range.
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Figure 1.23: Top Panel: The effect of having more than one child younger than
four years old, on spending more than income by more than 5%, in comparison with
households without any child in that age range. Bottom Two Panels: The effect of
dwelling status on spending more than income, in comparison to household who hold
mortgage debt.
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Figure 1.24: The effect of share of specific items in household budget in different
income groups. × signs show if the coefficient is significant at 5% level.
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Figure 1.25: The effect of share of specific items in household budget in different
income groups. × signs show if the coefficient is significant at 5% level.
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Figure 1.26: The effect of share of specific items in household budget in different
income groups. × signs show if the coefficient is significant at 5% level.
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Figure 1.27: The effect of share of specific items in household budget in different
income groups. × signs show if the coefficient is significant at 5% level.
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Figure 1.28: The effect of share of specific items in household budget in different
income groups. × signs show if the coefficient is significant at 5% level.
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Chapter 2
Do the Rich Save More?
Revisiting an Old Question with
New Approaches
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2.1 Introduction
The purpose of this study is to shed more light on the long-debated question of
whether more aﬄuent households save a larger fraction of their income. In other
words, the problem is whether the saving rate is flat across the income distribution
or whether it increases at higher income brackets. Even though common sense sug-
gests that more-aﬄuent families save a larger fraction of their income, compared to
middle-class and low-income households, historical evidence does not support this
proposition.
Looking at aggregate data, there is no significant correlation between per capita
income and the aggregate saving rate in time-series or cross-sectional datasets. In
spite of ever increasing per capita income, the aggregate saving rate was fairly con-
stant until the early 1980s and then continued to fall in the 1990s and 2000s. A
comparison of the cross-section of countries also fails to suggest any meaningful re-
lationship between per capita income and the aggregate saving rate.
Also, as income inequality rises in an economy, higher income households hold a
larger share of total income. If these households at the top of the income distribution
do save a larger fraction of their earnings, a higher aggregate saving rate should have
been observed in the past few decades. That has not been the case in any of the
advanced economies.
The empirical issue has remained cloudy, and there has not been a firm conclusion
on the matter since the beginning of the debate in the 1950s. However, the evolution
of macroeconomic models toward “representative agent” type models that assume a
constant saving rate for heterogeneous people shows the dominance of one side in
the development of economic models.
Policy-wise, the question bears a great deal of importance for several reasons. Op-
timality of the tax system greatly depends on the answer to the question of whether
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the propensity to save/consume varies over the income distribution, or whether high-
income households save proportionately the same as middle-class households. The
effectiveness of shifting tax policy towards consumption and income from saving ac-
counts depends highly on the relative amount of saving in various income groups. If
the saving rate does increase with long-run income, redistributing income from rich
to poor within an age group would be more efficient than redistributing from young
to old households within income groups.1
Moreover, finding heterogeneous trends in the decline of household saving rates,
that have resulted in the decline of the aggregate household saving rate from the
early 1980s to recent years, can help us understand the responsiveness of aggregate
consumption and saving to different policy reforms and economic shocks. Different
saving patterns among households also show relative degrees of preparedness for the
post-retirement period.
To empirically answer the question of whether the rich save more, several chal-
lenges must first be tackled, making this issue even more important in the empirical
literature. Both variables of interest are prone to suffer from measurement error.
While measurement error in the dependent variable, which is the saving rate, only
reduces the efficiency of estimates, a polluted independent variable, which is income,
causes biased estimates and inconsistent estimates.
Depending on the area of interest, different definitions of saving might be used.
They range from the most general definitions that include financial assets, owner-
occupied businesses, realized and unrealized capital gains on housing, and other
components of wealth, to a simple definition of saving that focuses on the differ-
ence between income, exclusive of capital gains, and current consumption. For the
purpose of this particular question, two measures of saving have been used in the
literature. The first is the change in household wealth that is not always available
in all micro-level datasets. The second is the household disposable income minus its
1See for example Burbidge and Davies (1994)
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consumption expenditures, excluding durables, which is more obtainable from survey
data. Fortunately, both measures are available in the FAMEX and SHS datasets.
We focus on the latter definition and use the former for sensitivity analysis.
The more-important concern is the definition and measurement of long-run in-
come. The current measure of income reported in surveys is a weak proxy for the
aﬄuence of households and has two sources of pollution, i) transitory components of
the income process and, ii) measurement error in self-reported income. According to
Friedman (1957), the two are indissolubly merged into the correct measure of income.
As long as saving is defined as the difference between income and consumption, if we
consider saving rate as the dependent variable on the left-hand side, the unobserved
components described above in current income would appear on both sides causing
upward bias in estimates.
Restarting the long-standing debate after a period of quiescence, Dynan (2004)
proposed a method to address the question and brought attention back to this is-
sue. In their influential work, they proposed a simple two-step method to estimate
the median saving rate at five different quintiles of income. Comparing five median
saving rate at five different income brackets, they conclude that the saving rate in-
creases in higher brackets of long-run income, under some circumstances even with
increasing rate.
The approach proposed by Dynan (2004) is still widely used in the literature to
address the question in different countries and varying data sets. Bozio and Dea
(2011) use both administrative and survey data on British household wealth and
consumption. Following Dynan’s methodology, they find a positive relationship be-
tween long-run income and saving rates for households in the United Kingdom.
In another study, Hori et al. (2015) employ Dynan’s methodology to evaluate the
relationship in Japanese Income and Consumption Survey data. Their results are
sensitive to the choice of instrument. When long-run income is proxied by education
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and occupation, a significant positive relationship is found between saving rate and
long-run income. However, the positive correlation disappears when they use con-
sumption as the long-run proxy.
Alan et al. (2015) apply this methodology to the Canadian FAMEX dataset and
surprisingly reach a different conclusion. They conclude that the rich do not save
more, at least compared to households in the middle of the income distribution.
They show that saving rate is flat above the median long-run income, and under
some circumstances, even falls after the median income level.
The controversial findings of Alan et al. (2015) made it appealing to revisit the
question and re-evaluate Dynan’s methodology with more advanced methods that ad-
dress the endogeneity problem in a quantile regression context. Only a few years after
Dynan (2004), more advanced methods were developed to handle different types of
endogeneity in Quantile Regression literature, in particular, Ma and Koenker (2006),
Lee (2004) and Horowitz and Lee (2007). Not only do these methods deal with the
endogeneity problem more efficiently, they also provide more-detailed information
about the joint distribution of the saving rate and income.
In this study, in a set of Monte Carlo simulations, we compare the performance
of three different Instrumental Quantile Regression approaches, in addition to the
methodology proposed in Dynan (2004). We define three different environments
to highlight advantages and limitations of these methods in different frameworks.
These methods are specifically chosen since each addresses certain characteristics of
the data and their structure is more applicable to the problem. Also, they are more
comparable to what Dynan (2004) propose, theoretically and empirically.
The rest of this paper is formatted as following; the next section discusses four dif-
ferent approaches that address the endogeneity issue with different presumptions and
structure in the context of Instrumental Variable Quantile Regression. In Section.2.3,
three different Monte Carlo environments are presented and then the performance
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of four methods are compared. The data is discussed in Section.2.4, and the result
of implementing four approaches are reported in Section.2.5.
2.2 Alternative Approaches
In this section, we compare Dynan’s methodology with other two-step estimators that
have been developed in the Instrumental Variable Quantile Regression literature. We
consider the parametric approach of Ma and Koenker (2006), the semi-parametric
method proposed in Lee (2004), and finally, the fully non-parametric approach of
Horowitz and Lee (2007). We further address the advantages and limitations of each
method. The general framework is defined as:
s = f(Y ∗) + Z ′2α2 +  (2.1)
In the context of the saving rate and long-run income, s represents the house-
hold’s saving rate, Y ∗ stands for the long-run income, and Z2 stands for possible
exogenous variables such as age and other demographic variables. The measurement
error and transitory income shocks inherent in reported income make it a poor proxy
for long-run income. If we define saving as income minus consumption expenditures,
the presence of measurement error in current income on both sides of the equation
(2.1), creates a positive bias in the estimation, even when there is no relationship
between the two variables.
If the final goal is to model the relationship of long-run income and the saving
rate, by replacing long-run income with the observed income, equation (2.1) will
become:
s = f(Y ) + Z ′2α2 + U (2.2)
Assuming that f(Y )− f(Y ∗) = φ(Y − Y ∗), We can write:
f(Y )− f(Y ∗) = φ(V )
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where V = Y − Y ∗, then the error term in the equation (2.2) is defined as
U = φ(V ) + , (2.3)
We can define V as the measurement error and transitory components of income.
Then U is a composite error term which is a combination of measurement errors and
transitory shocks in income and saving rate. The presence of V in equation (2.2)
through U , either linearly or non-linearly, causes endogeneity, and any independent
estimate of the relationship of income and the saving rate will be biased and incon-
sistent.
In equation (2.3), Dynan (2004) parameterize f(.) by five dummy variables and
assume a linear format for φ(.). By running a median regression on five dummy
variables, they estimate the median saving rate in five different brackets of long-run
income and compare them to see if the saving rate is increasing in higher income
brackets.
In our first alternative approach, a specification proposed in Ma and Koenker
(2006), V enters in equation (2.2) linearly while it is interacted with income. This
interaction term introduces nice features that we will discuss in the next sections.
The second approach is a proposed framework in Lee (2004) which considers a lin-
ear format for f(.), however, in order to capture any potential non-linearity between
s and V , φ(.) is estimated non-parametrically. This semi-parametric specification
assumes a linear relationship between income and saving rate, which varies at differ-
ent quantiles of income distribution. Also, it does not make any assumption about
the relationship of V and s.
Finally, we use the non-parametric instrumental variable approach developed by
Horowitz and Lee (2007), which estimates f(.) non-parametrically and makes no as-
sumption about the underlying format of f(.) and φ(.). Each framework is discussed
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in details in the following sections.
2.2.1 Dynan’s Methodology
The widely used methodology, proposed by Dynan (2004), to assess the relationship
of households saving rate and long-run income is as follows:
s = f(Y ∗) + Z ′2β + U
where Y ∗ represents long-run income purged of transitory income and measurement
errors. In order to allow for non-linearities in the relationship and, at the same time,
avoid a complex estimation method, Dynan uses five dummy variables instead of
f(.), standing for five different brackets of long-run income.
In the first step, in order to control for transitory income shocks and the mea-
surement error problem in the observed income, a proxy for long-run income is con-
structed by regressing observed income on some individual instruments such as edu-
cation, lagged and lead income, and total expenditure. Then fitted values of income
from this regression, representing true long-run income, are used to assign households
to five brackets of long-run income.
Dij =
1 if Yˆj ∈ ithIncome Bracket, i = {1, ..., 5}0 otherwise
where
Yˆ = βˆ0 + Z
′
1βˆ1 + Z
′
2βˆ2 (2.4)
Here Z1 is a vector of instruments and Z2 includes other exogenous variables such
as age group. In the second stage, a conditional median saving rate is estimated by
running a median regression on the five dummy variables defined above and other
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exogenous variables while the intercept is suppressed.
Qs(0.5|D,Z2) =
5∑
i=1
Diαi + Z
′
2β
In this approach αi’s represent the median saving rate in five different brackets
of long-run income, where long-run income is proxied by some instruments.
Due to its simple framework, this method has attracted a significant attention
in the literature. Even though simple, this method works very well in some circum-
stances and predicts the saving rate very well. However, it has some drawbacks and
we will show in Section.(2.3) that in more complicated situations, it fails to predict
saving rate when we move toward the tails of the income distribution. This method-
ology works similar to a low-resolution non-parametric approach, and it does not
provide an accurate picture of the entire joint distribution of income and saving rate.
2.2.2 Parametric Control Variate Model
The first alternative method that we implement is the Control variate Estimation
method proposed by Ma and Koenker (2006). This specification has the following
triangular specification.
s = α0 + α1Y + Z
′
2α2 + α3(+ λV︸ ︷︷ ︸
U
)Y (2.5)
Y = β0 + Z
′
1β1 + Z
′
2β2 + V (2.6)
where
V ∼ Fv,  ∼ F
In this framework, V and  are interacted with Y to capture any scale-effect
that Y may introduce into s and that can be translated into the heteroskedasticity
observed between income and saving/consumption. Assuming λ > 0, it captures the
upward bias due to measurement error and transitory changes in income, i.e. V .
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Consistent estimating of α1, requires V and  be i.i.d and independent of Z1 and Y ,
with V ∼ Fv and  ∼ F. This approach also requires Y to be predetermined with
respect to s, this means that households observe income first and then decide how
much to save. All these assumptions can be summarized in (2.7).
QU(τ1|Z1, Z2) = QU(τ1|V, Z2) = QU(τ1|V ) ≡ F−1 (τ1) + λV (2.7)
What equation (2.7) means is that the dependency of U on Z1 can be explained
through V , and they do not depend on Z2. In other words, conditional distribution
of U can be explained by conditioning on V .
The conventional 2SLS estimator of α1 is
α1 = (Yˆ
′MZ2Yˆ )
−1Yˆ ′MZ2s
where
Yˆ = αˆ2Z1 + Z
′
2βˆ2
However, in the Control variate approach, in equation (2.2) instead of replacing
Y by Yˆ , Y − Vˆ is used, which is equal to Yˆ . This basically means including Vˆ
in equation (2.2) and estimates of α1 and α2 remain the same as the estimates of
2SLS, when ordinary least square is used. Now, quantile regression provides us with
features that allows us to estimate the relationship of income and saving rate at
different points of the joint distribution. To apply this method, we first estimate the
conditional quantile function of Y (conditional on Z1 and Z2), in order to calculate
V (τ2) = V − F−1v (τ2). This quantile regression is done at different quantiles, in
this study τ2 = (0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9), to obtain a set of Vˆ (τ2)s. In the second stage
another quantile regression is done with each of these Vˆ (τ2)s, in order to evaluate
the relationship at different quantiles of income, τ2.
QY (τ2|Z1, Z2) = β0 + Z ′1β1 + Z ′2β2 + F−1v (τ2) (2.8)
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By adding and subtracting F−1v (τ2) = V − V (τ2) in the equation (2.5), which is the
τ th2 quantile of V , we have
s = α0 + α1Y + Z
′
2α2 + α3
(
U + λV − λF−1v (τ2) + λF−1v (τ2)
)
Y
= α0 + α1Y + Z
′
2α2 + α3
(
U + λV (τ2) + λF
−1
v (τ2)
)
Y
= α0 + Z1α2 + Y
(
α1 + α3U + α3λF
−1
v (τ2)
)
+ α3λV (τ2)Y
Therefore the conditional quantile of the saving rate at τ1 is
Qs(τ1|Y, Z2, V (τ2)) = α0 + Z2α2 + Y
(
α1 + F
−1
u (τ1) + λF
−1
v (τ2)
)
+ λα3V (τ2)Y
(2.9)
By estimating (2.9) with conventional quantile regression, we have:
Qs(τ1|Y, Z2, V (τ2)) = δ0(τ1) + δ1(τ1, τ2)Y + δ2(τ1)Z2 + δ3(τ1)Vˆ (τ2)Y (2.10)
This implies the following equalities:
δ0(τ1) = α0
δ1(τ1, τ2) = α1 + α3
(
F−1u (τ1) +
λ
β3
F−1v (τ2)
)
δ2(τ1) = α2
δ3(τ1) = λα3
(2.11)
In equation (2.10), Vˆ (τ2) is estimated consistently as the residuals of a linear quantile
regression of Y on instrument Z1, exogenous variables Z2 and 1 in equation (2.8),
at different τ2s. The fact that δ1 is a function of τ2 implies that, the effect of Y on
s is different at different quantiles of income. Unlike 2SLS, which provides a single
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slope coefficient for Y , at different quantiles of income distribution, we will have a
different coefficient. This structural model helps to evaluate the relationship between
saving rate and income at different quantiles of income distribution, i.e. estimating
different quantiles of the saving rate at different points of income distribution. It is
proved in Ma and Koenker (2006) that the 2SLS estimate is equal to the average of
δ(τ1, τ2) over the range of τ2.
Including Vˆ in (2.10) helps us to estimate the relationship at different quantiles
of income such that, by changing τ1 and τ2, we can estimate the relationship at dif-
ferent points of the joint distribution. This is comparable to 2SLS, which estimates
a single coefficient for the entire income distribution, and the Dynan methodology
which categorize the observations into a few dummy variables in order to predict the
saving rate in each of these categories. Moreover interaction of Vˆ with income also
provides the feature to control for the heteroskedastic relationship between income
and the saving rate.
2.2.3 Semi-Parametric Control Function Model
The Control function approach, an extension to the Control variate method in a
semi-parametric fashion, requires less restrictive assumptions and lowers the risk
of mis-specification. It offers the same triangular structure without imposing any
structure on Vˆ (τ2) in equation (2.5). In the same structural model as in the Control
variate method,
s = Y α1(τ1) + Z2α2(τ1) + U (2.12)
Y = β0 + Z1β1(τ2) + Z2β2(τ2) + V (2.13)
The composite error term is defined as U = φ(V ) + , where φ(.) is a real-valued
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function of V . A consistent estimation of α1 and α2 requires
QU(τ1|Z1, Z2) = QU(τ1|V, Z2) = QU(τ1|V ) ≡ φ(V ) (2.14)
and
QV (τ2|Z1, Z2) = 0 (2.15)
The equivalency implies that conditional quantiles of U are a function of V , i.e.
U = φ(V ) + . The Control function method imposes a weaker restriction and does
not assume any functional form for the dependency of U on V . The two step es-
timator is as follows. In the first step, Vˆ (τ) is obtained through a linear quantile
regression of Y on the instrument Z1, exogenous variables Z2 and 1, the same as in
the Control variate approach.
QY (τ2|Z1, Z2)) = β0 + β1Z1 + β2Z2 (2.16)
The second step involves a semi-parametric regression of s on Y , Z2 and a poly-
nomial approximation of φ(.).
Qs(τ1|Y, Z2, Vˆ (τ2)) = α0 + α1Y + α2Z2 + φ(Vˆ ) (2.17)
Root MSPE is used at τ2 = τ1 = 0.5 to choose the optimal order of polynomial.
Then equation (2.17) is estimated at five different quantiles. Again the different
coefficient of Y would be different at different τ2’s, and they are being interpreted as
the marginal effect of long-run income on the saving rate.
2.3 Monte Carlo Simulations
In this section, in a set of Monte Carlo experiments, we investigate the performance
of the four approaches to estimate an endogenous relationship in three different en-
vironments. First, a regular type of endogeneity is introduced in a nonlinear DGP
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with different parameterizations to test the prediction power of all four approaches.
Also in a linear DGP, we introduce a non-linear type of endogeneity to test the
performance of these approaches in correcting for the endogeneity problem, when
error terms are non-linearly related to regressors. Finally, in a more restrictive struc-
tural model, a third type of endogeneity is used that introduces a scale-effect in the
model while the DGP remains linear. To investigate the performance of the four
methods discussed above, we compare the root MSPE of predicted values for the
saving rate, sˆ, at five different quantiles of income.
Dynan’s approach and the non-parametric IV method can provide us with only
the predicted values of the saving rate sˆ. In the Control variate methods, the slope
coefficients are also estimated so that we can compare their performances in a more
detailed level. In all experiments, the sample size and number of iterations are set
to 1000.
2.3.1 Non-Linear DGP with Linear Endogeneity
In this environment, a regular linear correlation between error term and the regressor
is considered, while the regressor enters into the equation in a non-linear fashion. In
the context of the relationship between saving rate and income, in equation (2.1),
f(.) is considered non-linearly, and φ(.) has a linear form.
Samples are generated through three standard normal random variables to create
the error term, the endogenous regressor, and the IV, all of which are mutually
correlated.2
U1 ∼ N(0, 1), U2 ∼ N(0, 1), U3 ∼ N(0, 1) (2.18)
The instrument, Z, is basically a standard normal random variable that is trans-
2This is a modified version of the specification in Horowitz and Lee (2009)
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formed into [0, 1] interval through its cumulative distribution function.
Z ∼ CDF (U1) (2.19)
The endogenous variable (Income) is defined as a weighted average of U1 and U3
so it is correlated with both the instrument and the error term.
Y ∼ CDF (ρU1 +
√
(1− ρ2)U3) (2.20)
and the error term that is correlated with the endogenous variable through U3 is
defined below.
U ∼ σCDF (ηU2 +
√
(1− η2)U3) (2.21)
A non-linear DGP is defined as a third degree polynomial as in (2.22). a non-
linear DGP helps us avoid any assumption or restriction on the relationship of income
and saving rate.3
f(Y ) = θ0 + θ1Y + θ2Y
2 + θ3Y
3 (2.22)
And finally the saving rate is defined as the sum of the f(.) and the error term.
s = f(Y ) + U (2.23)
Model parameters are defined as (ρ, η, σ) = (0.8, 0.5, 0.1). A sample of 200 ob-
servations from data is depicted in Figure.??, where the numbers in the lower panel
represent the correlation between variables. Bias, standard deviation, and the root
mean squared error (MSPE) for all four methods are reported in Table.2.1. The
NPQR row represents the results of a non-parametric quantile regression of the sav-
ing rate on income, without considering the endogeneity issue. We also evaluate
the performance of the parametric Control variate method and the semi-parametric
3For the purpose of sensitivity analysis, we consider four different parameterizations for this
non-linear DGP to make sure that our results are robust to different shapes of f(Y ). The results
for the other three parameterizations are reported in the Appendix
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Control function approaches in estimating the slope of f(Y ) at five quantiles of Y ,
which are reported in Table.2.4.
In this framework, Dynan’s method outperforms the other methods in terms of
both bias and variance, even though the other methods are doing a fine job. Ta-
ble.2.4 shows the result of estimating the slope of f(.) by the Control variate and
the Control function methods at five quintiles of income. Lee’s method has a better
performance especially off the median, while the bias increases with higher quintiles
in the Control variate approach.
Table 2.1: Monte Carlo Experiment, N = 1000, R = 1000.
τ = 0.1 τ = 0.3 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.7 τ = 0.9
Bias
Control Variate -0.0209 -0.0494 -0.0094 0.0414 0.0513
Control Function -0.0372 -0.0447 -0.0009 0.0451 0.0356
Horowitz & Lee 0.1335 0.0316 -0.0666 -0.0169 0.1352
Dynan -0.0085 -0.0235 0.0004 0.0229 0.0076
NPQR (No IV) -0.0282 -0.0208 0.0326 0.0861 0.0930
Standard Deviation
Control Variate 0.0002 0.0005 0.0011 0.0018 0.0012
Control Function 0.0011 0.0018 0.0017 0.0016 0.0010
Horowitz & Lee 0.0037 0.0043 0.0022 0.0045 0.0044
Dynan 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003
NPQR (No IV) 0.0006 0.0007 0.0007 0.0008 0.0010
Root MSPE
Control Variate 0.0006 0.0029 0.0012 0.0036 0.0039
Control Function 0.0025 0.0038 0.0017 0.0036 0.0023
Horowitz & Lee 0.0215 0.0053 0.0066 0.0048 0.0227
Dynan 0.0003 0.0008 0.0002 0.0008 0.0003
NPQR (No IV) 0.0014 0.0011 0.0018 0.0082 0.0096
Note: Entries are the Bias, Standard Deviation, and Root MSPE for
predictions of conditional median saving rate at five different quantiles
of income, with the DGP described in Section.2.3.1.
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Figure 2.1: A sample of 200 observations from the DGP described in Section.2.3.1,
Numbers in lower panel are the correlations between variables.
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2.3.2 Linear DGP with Non-Linear Endogeneity
The environment in this section aims to examine and compare the performance of
the four approaches when a non-linear type of endogeneity is present in the model.
For the sake of simplicity, the relationship between Y and s is considered to be a
linear one in order to focus on the effect of the new type of endogeneity.4 It can be
interpreted that in equation (2.1), f(.) takes a linear form while φ(.) appears in a
non-linear form as in (2.25).
Consider a recursive specification as indicated below,
s = Y β + + φ(V )
Y = Zα + V
(2.24)
where
φ(V ) = V + 4 exp[−(V − 1)2] (2.25)
and
V ∼ N(0, 1),  ∼ N(0, 1) (2.26)
In this environment, Y is related to the error term in a non-linear form. φ(V )
produces a hump around one and is the source of non-linearity in the endogenous
relationship. The IV is generated from a standard normal distribution while linearly
normalized to [0, 1] interval. Figure.?? shows a sample of 200 observations from one
realization of the data. The numbers in the lower panels represent the correlations
between variables.
Table.2.2 shows the bias, standard deviation and root MSPE of predicted values
for sˆ at five different quantiles of Y . In this specification, with non-linear endogene-
ity, Dynan does a poor job, even though it has a lower variance, due to its linear
nature. The magnitude of the bias is not negligible and increases as we move away
from the median. The Non-Parametric IV method does an even worse job in esti-
4This is a modified version of the specification in Lee (2004)
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mating the true saving rate.
The Control function approach outperforms other methods in this environment
as it is expected, while the Control variate method has slightly larger root MSPEs.
From Table.2.5 we can see that the Control function approach has a trivially small
bias in estimating the slope coefficient β. This means that small biases in estimates
of sˆ come mostly from the estimates of the intercept.
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Figure 2.2: A sample of 200 observations from the DGP described in Section.2.3.2,
Numbers in lower panel are the correlations between variables.
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Table 2.2: Monte Carlo Experiment, N = 1000, R = 1000.
τ = 0.1 τ = 0.3 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.7 τ = 0.9
Bias
Control Variate 0.2051 -0.0354 -0.1119 -0.1593 -0.0129
Control Function -0.0338 -0.0645 -0.0433 0.0037 0.1153
Horowitz & Lee -1.2226 -1.9465 -2.5604 -3.1777 -3.9477
Dynan 1.2553 0.4993 -0.0337 -0.5736 -1.3405
NPQR (No IV) 6.1890 6.0539 6.0078 5.9859 5.9926
Standard Deviation
Control Variate 0.3462 0.4077 0.4440 0.5128 0.5461
Control Function 0.1302 0.1009 0.0948 0.0974 0.1299
Horowitz & Lee 0.0947 0.1170 0.1081 0.1206 0.0949
Dynan 0.1506 0.1575 0.1634 0.1570 0.1636
NPQR (No IV) 164.7090 164.7430 164.7453 164.7566 164.8593
Root MSPE
Control Variate 0.4024 0.4092 0.4579 0.5370 0.5462
Control Function 0.1345 0.1198 0.1042 0.0975 0.1737
Horowitz & Lee 1.2263 1.9500 2.5626 3.1800 3.9489
Dynan 1.2643 0.5235 0.1669 0.5947 1.3505
NPQR (No IV) 164.8252 164.8542 164.8549 164.8653 164.9681
Note: Entries are the Bias, Standard Deviation, and Root MSPE for
predictions of conditional median saving rate at five different quantiles
of income, with the DGP described in Section.2.3.2.
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2.3.3 Linear DGP with Heteroskedastic Endogeneity
In this simulation experiment we consider a structural model that combines a linear
DGP with a scale-shift type of endogeneity as below.5
s = β0 + β1Y + δ(+ λV )Y
Y = α0 + Z
′α1 + V
(2.27)
where
V ∼ N(0, 1),  ∼ N(0, 0.25)
Again in the context of equation (2.1), both f(.) and φ(.) are linear, however,
the interaction between Y and U =  + λV creates a scale-shift effects that can be
translated into the heteroskedasticity observed in the relationship between saving
rate and income. Scale-shift effect means that larger values of V , are associated with
not only the larger values of Y and s but also affect the conditional variance of s, and
it increases at higher quantiles of Y . As it was shown in (2.11), the slope coefficient
for income, δ1(τ1, τ2) depends on τ2, the income quantile.
The model is parameterized as (α0, α1, δ, λ, β0, β1) = (1, 1, 1.5, 5, 1, 1) and Z is
generated from a normal distribution, Z ∼ N(1, 4) that is normalized to [0, 1] inter-
val. Figure.?? shows a sample of 200 observations from this DGP.
Results of this Monte Carlo experiment are reported in Table.2.3, Dynan’s esti-
mates are completely biased when we move away from the median, and the magnitude
of the bias is not comparable with the results from Control variate and Control func-
tion approaches. Control function approach has a fairly better performance than the
Control variate, regarding predicted values of saving rate, but not in estimating the
slope coefficient of the income. While we saw that the performance of Control vari-
ate method was worse compared to Control function’s performance in the previous
section, we had a non-linear endogeneity.
5This is a modified version of the specification designed in Ma and Koenker (2006).
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To summarize the results of three Monte Carlo simulations, we can say that in
the first environment with linear endogeneity, all four methods do a fine job with
Dynan slightly outperforming the rest in terms of both bias and variance. In the
second environment, not surprisingly Dynan and Nonparametric IV methods show
significant bias in predicting the saving rate. Control variate method does a more
efficient job in estimating the slope coefficient than the predicting the saving rate.
In the third environment, the performance of Dynan and Nonparametric IV ap-
proaches are very poor and show significantly large biases. Regarding the prediction
of saving rate, Control function method outperforms Control variate approach in this
environment. However, Control variate approach estimates the slope coefficient with
smaller bias and variance.
2.4 Data
Data used in this study are drawn from two famous Canadian surveys: the Fam-
ily Expenditure survey (FAMEX), conducted by Statistics Canada in 1982, 1984,
1986, 1990, 1992 and 1996; and the Survey of Household Spending (SHS), a revised
version of FAMEX, which is conducted on a yearly basis from 1997 to 2009. For
several reasons these data sets, in particular, FAMEX, are known for possessing high
quality6. Unlike most surveys, these are not diary-based surveys, instead, households
are interviewed in person in January, February and March for the previous calendar
year. Detailed information on expenditures is collected by recall and reference to
bills, receipts, and records from the previous year. In order to gather thorough in-
formation, multiple lengthy interviews are conducted. Another feature contributing
to the credibility of these surveys is the “Balance Edit” that is a quality control
measure. Households whose report of expenditure are more than 20% different from
6See for example Brzozowski and Crossley (2011) and Barrett et al. (2013)
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Figure 2.3: A sample of 200 observations from the DGP designed in Section.2.3.3,
Numbers in lower panel are correlations between variables.
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Table 2.3: Monte Carlo Experiment, N = 1000, R = 1000.
τ = 0.1 τ = 0.3 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.7 τ = 0.9
Bias
Control Variate 0.2291 0.1950 0.0656 -0.1790 -0.6192
Control Function 0.2102 0.2007 0.0783 -0.1787 -0.6349
Horowitz & Lee 2.3664 0.3773 -2.3317 -6.0926 -13.2484
Dynan 4.4950 2.6029 -0.0614 -3.8368 -11.2127
NPQR (No IV) -1.0785 -1.2985 -1.4735 -1.7806 -2.2615
Variance
Control Variate 0.9607 1.3623 1.6905 1.9241 2.4266
Control Function 0.9874 1.3694 1.6871 1.9169 2.4368
Horowitz & Lee 0.0618 0.0832 0.1310 0.1381 0.0917
Dynan 0.4798 0.5375 0.5500 0.6254 0.6777
NPQR (No IV) 8.8607 8.8865 8.8878 9.0031 8.9332
MSPE
Control Variate 0.9877 1.3762 1.6918 1.9324 2.5043
Control Function 1.0095 1.3840 1.6889 1.9252 2.5181
Horowitz & Lee 2.3672 0.3864 2.3354 6.0941 13.2487
Dynan 4.5205 2.6578 0.5534 3.8875 11.2332
NPQR (No IV) 8.9260 8.9808 9.0091 9.1775 9.2150
Note: Entries are the Bias, Standard Deviation, and Root MSPE for
predictions of conditional median saving rate at five different quantiles
of income, with the DGP designed in Section.2.3.3.
the sum of income and the net increase in assets, are asked to review their report in
the data collecting stage. In the processing stage, if the disparity is still more than
20%, observation is removed from data.7
For the matter of comparability with previous works in the literature, we follow
the same rules for sample selection and variable definitions. Even though we esti-
mate this relationship at all survey years, we focus on the year of 1996 to compare
our results with Alan et al. (2015) who chose the same year, due to data quality
7Except for the year of 2006, due to adaptation of Computer Assisted Personal Interviewing
(CAPI) for the first time, instead of paper-pencil based interview, Balance Edit is not applied.
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concerns8. In our sub-sample, the age profile of the head of households is restricted
to 29 to 59, whose income is greater than 1000$.
In order to evaluate the relationship between the saving rate and household in-
come, Dynan (2004) define the concept of “Active Saving”, which is the fraction
of current income not spent. FAMEX and SHS datasets provide us with two mea-
sures of saving in this context. The first one is the common measure of saving as
the difference between a household’s disposable income and their total expenditure.
Elaborate information on the household expenditures in FAMEX dataset gives us
the advantage of obtaining an accurate measure of saving, that is not available in
other datasets used in the literature.
Another measure of saving that is reported in FAMEX and SHS dataset is the
yearly change in the household’s wealth. This includes the total net change in assets,
less total net change in debts. The difference between the two measures is used to
perform the “Balance Edit” test explained above. The two measures are highly cor-
related and if there is any, they suffer from the same source of measurement error.
Findings of Alan et al. (2015) is very consistent across the two measures and the
choice of saving measure makes little difference to our central question. Estimates
based on net changes in wealth give lower saving rates than those based on the dif-
ference between income and consumption.
Disposable income, net household income after taxes, including wages and salaries,
investment income, self-employment earnings, government transfers, and income
from other sources. Total consumption is defined as household’s total expenditure
and includes expenditures for housing, food, clothing, household operations, personal
care, transportation, recreation, education, tobacco and alcoholic beverages, reading
materials and miscellaneous expenses. Principal payments of mortgage are consid-
ered as saving; and interest payments are treated as consumption. Our definition of
8e.g. after 1996, interest payments on the mortgage are not reported separately from the principal
payments
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non-durable consumption excludes expenditures on durables, i.e., vehicles, housing,
and household furnishings and equipment.
2.5 Empirical Results
In this section, the results of estimating Equation.(2.1) with four different methods
are reported. Even though we estimate this relationship at all survey years, for the
matter of comparability with Alan et al. (2015), we also focus on the year of 1996.
Due to data quality concerns, Alan et al. (2015) choose this year. For the relation-
ship between saving rate and Current Income, Burbidge and Davies (1994) and Alan
et al. (2015), find strong evidence for a positive relationship in Canada and we avoid
to investigate this any further, as it is not our primary interest in this study. We
start our analyses by documenting the results from different approaches we discussed
earlier in this article.
We use Non-Durable Consumption and its components, as instruments in these
regressions. Education of the head of the household and his/her spouse is another
instrument that is used in the literature for long-run income. However, use of this
instrument when saving is the left-hand side variable, have always been followed by
strong critiques. The argument is that people with higher education are more pa-
tient and tend to consume less to invest for a higher consumption in future. For this
reason, it was preferred to withdraw education from the set of instruments.
Table.2.7 to Table.2.11 show the predicted values for saving rate at different quin-
tiles of long-run income. Our results are very consistent across different instruments.
But the trends are not very similar among the different estimators. In Dynan’s ap-
proach, five saving rates are obtained as the coefficients of five dummy variables from
a single median regression. In control variate and control function methods, each
saving rates is a predicted value of a separate regression. For the nonparametric
approach, saving rates are the predicted values at the same percentiles as other ap-
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proaches. The results from control variate and control function methods are close,
and both show an increasing saving rate across higher quintiles of income. However,
the results of the other two methods show a different behavior.
Table.2.7 to Table.2.11 show the predicted values for saving rate at different quin-
tiles of long-run income. Our results are very consistent across different instruments.
But the trends are not very similar between different estimators. In Dynan’s ap-
proach, five saving rates are obtained from a single regression as the coefficients of
five dummy variables. In control variate and control function approaches, each saving
rate is a predicted value of a separate regression. For the non-parametric approach,
saving rates are the predicted values at the same percentiles as other approaches.
The results from control variate and control function methods are close and both
show an increasing saving rate across higher quintiles of income. However, the re-
sults of the other two methods show a different behavior.
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis and the significance of coefficients
are illustrated with asterisks. An age dummy variable for households with the head
of younger than 45 years old is included in all regressions and coefficients are re-
ported. In Dynan methodology, a single coefficient is estimated for age groups at
all quintiles of income. However, since a separate regression is estimated at each
quintile of income in Control variate and Control function methods, we have differ-
ent estimates for the age dummy variable coefficient. In Nonparametric IV method,
the function is estimated separately for the two age groups, and the difference is
reported. Age dummy variables are not significant generally. Except in Dynan’s
method, they are positive and show different trends across estimators(but consistent
across instruments).
Regression results are illustrated in Figure.2.4 to Figure.2.7. Each figure shows
predicted saving rates estimated at different quintiles of income by one of the four
methods using various instruments. Results are considerably consistent among the
various instruments for all estimators. In Figure.2.4 and Figure.2.5 Control variate
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and Control function methods show a monotonically rising saving rate at different
quintiles of long-run income. Control variate method shows a more convex relation-
ship, meaning saving rate increases at a higher rate at higher quintiles of income.
Results from Dynan method are depicted in Figure.2.6. Consistent with findings
of Alan et al. (2015), the saving rate is not increasing with quintiles of long-run in-
come in this approach. It ranges from 5% to 25%, but peaks at the fourth quintile of
income when “Non-Durable Consumption”, “Food Expenditure” and “Restaurant”
expenses are used as instruments for long-run income. When “Total Consumption”
and “Food and Clothing” costs are used as the instrument, saving rate is at highest
in the third quintile of income and then falls.
Figure.2.7 shows the non-parametric estimation of the relationship across the
long-run income distribution when it is proxied by different instruments. Generally
across all instruments, in the first quintile of income, the saving rate is increasing
with a peak at the 20th percentile of income and the group of younger households
tend to have a higher saving rate. Generally speaking, the saving rate does not
change significantly after the 20th percentile of income, especially for the case that
Restaurant expenses are used as the instrument. When total consumption is the in-
strument, the saving rate drops for both age groups, while younger households save
more. When other components of consumption are used as the instrument, saving
rate is decreasing until the 60th percentile of income and then it increases while again
younger households tend to have a higher saving rate.
We can have a better comparison of the results of four methods in Figure.2.8
that shows the result of all four methods in one plot. These are predictions of sav-
ing rate for households with a head of older than 45 years old. Results from few
other survey years are also reported in Figure.2.9 to Figure.2.11. The results are
quite consistent across the years. Across all instruments, Dynan method and the
Non-parametric method both show a bell-curved shape, that peaks in about 50th
percentile of income in the former and around 25th percentile of income in the latter
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approach. In contrast, in Control variate method and Control function methods sav-
ing rate increases monotonically and Control function method estimates a steeper
slope compared to Control variate approach. Estimates of the saving rate from differ-
ent approaches are somehow close around the median income level. However in the
bottom quantiles, Control variate, and Control function methods estimate a much
lower saving rate and a higher saving rate at higher quantiles of income.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper revisited an old question with new approaches and tried to highlight lim-
itations and advantages of these approaches in a series of Monte Carlo experiments.
The long debated question is whether household saving rate increases over the long-
run income distribution or more well-off households at higher quantiles of long-run
income save the same proportion of their income as middle class and low income
households.
We consider three alternative approaches in addition to the methodology pro-
posed by Dynan (2004). In a series of Monte Carlo experiments, the performance of
four approaches is tested in three different environments. Results show that Dynan’s
methodology outperforms only when there is a simple linear type of endogeneity in
the model and with more complicated types of endogeneity, it fails to predict true
saving rate, and its bias increases as we move away from median towards tails of
distribution.
In the end, using FAMEX and SHS datasets from Canada from 1982 to 2009
with a focus on 1996. We re-evaluated the question with the alternative methods.
Our findings varied from those of Alan et al. (2015) that use the same dataset. Our
empirical analysis suggest that more aﬄuent households do save a larger fraction
of their income. The results are not sensitive to different instruments and does not
change significantly over the years.
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Income, Under 45 Years Old, 2001.
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Table 2.4: Monte Carlo Experiment, N = 1000, R = 1000.
τ = 0.1 τ = 0.3 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.7 τ = 0.9
Bias
Control Variate 0.0591 0.1532 0.1984 0.2188 0.2409
Control Function 0.0930 0.1649 0.1838 0.1647 0.0920
Variance
Control Variate 0.0032 0.0012 0.0008 0.0007 0.0007
Control Function 0.0020 0.0009 0.0008 0.0010 0.0020
MSPE
Control Variate 0.0067 0.0247 0.0402 0.0486 0.0587
Control Function 0.0107 0.0281 0.0346 0.0281 0.0105
Note: Entries are the Bias, Standard Deviation, and Root MSPE
for estimation of the slope of f(Y ), the function defining the rela-
tionship between income and saving rate.
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Figure 2.11: Median Saving Rates Estimated at Five Quintiles of Predicted Log-Run
Income, Under 45 Years Old, 2008.
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Table 2.5: Monte Carlo Experiment, N = 1000, R = 1000.
τ = 0.1 τ = 0.3 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.7 τ = 0.9
Bias
Control Variate -0.3944 0.0317 0.3175 0.6117 1.0272
Control Function -0.0344 -0.0227 -0.0281 -0.0258 -0.0344
Standard Deviation
Control Variate 0.4630 0.3822 0.3503 0.3266 0.3031
Control Function 0.4688 0.4162 0.4086 0.4227 0.4749
Root MSPE
Control Variate 0.6082 0.3835 0.4728 0.6934 1.0710
Control Function 0.4700 0.4168 0.4096 0.4235 0.4762
Note: Entries are the Bias, Standard Deviation, and Root MSPE for
estimation of the slope coefficient β in Equation.2.24.
Table 2.6: Monte Carlo Experiment, N = 1000, R = 1000.
τ = 0.1 τ = 0.3 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.7 τ = 0.9
Bias
Control Variate 0.0533 0.0053 0.0100 0.0154 0.0097
Control Function -0.1050 -0.0613 -0.0388 -0.0241 -0.0469
Variance
Control Variate 0.5462 0.3450 0.3007 0.2691 0.2935
Control Function 1.0615 0.5809 0.5023 0.4170 0.4784
MSPE
Control Variate 0.5488 0.3450 0.3008 0.2695 0.2937
Control Function 1.0666 0.5841 0.5038 0.4177 0.4807
Note: Entries are the Bias, Standard Deviation, and Root MSPE for
estimation of the slope coefficient β1 in Equation.2.27.
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Table 2.7: Predicted Median Saving Rate at Different Quintiles of Predicted Long-
Run Income, proxied by “Non-Durable Consumption”, 1996.
τ = 0.1 τ = 0.3 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.7 τ = 0.9
Control Variate 5.23*** 10.87*** 15.96*** 24.6*** 48.99***
(1.27) (0.97) (0.87) (0.88) (1.54)
Age < 45 1.64 1.79* 1.73* 1.84* 0.91
(1.09) (1.04) (1.03) (1.03) (0.99)
Control Function -7.09*** 9.72*** 21.4*** 33.86*** 57.33***
(1.43) (0.78) (0.77) (0.96) (1.81)
Age < 45 1.28 0.35 0.14 0.27 -0.9
(0.97) (0.76) (0.82) (1.03) (1.31)
Non-Parametric IV 9.93*** 24.56*** 21.23*** 20.38*** 24.78***
(2.28) (2.15) (2.93) (1.5) (3.26)
Age < 45 3.5 4.39* 0.25 1.52 3.63
(3.16) (2.63) (3.24) (1.78) (3.57)
Dynan 7.69*** 20.58*** 24.92*** 27.39*** 21.82***
(1.26) (1.64) (1.74) (1.28) (1.24)
Age < 45 -0.81 -0.81 -0.81 -0.81 -0.81
(1.05) (1.05) (1.05) (1.05) (1.05)
1. Sample Size: 6444 Households
2. Standard errors based on 999 bootstrap replications
3. ***p ¡ 0.01, **p ¡ 0.05, *p ¡ 0.1
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Table 2.8: Predicted Median Saving Rate at Different Quintiles of Predicted Long-
Run Income, proxied by “Food Expenditures”, 1996.
τ = 0.1 τ = 0.3 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.7 τ = 0.9
Control Variate 2.4** 10.91*** 16.84*** 23.62*** 37.64***
(1.06) (0.76) (0.79) (0.87) (1.4)
Age < 45 1.72 2.26** 2.06* 1.78 0.69
(1.08) (1.07) (1.08) (1.12) (1.13)
Control Function -4.83*** 11.22*** 21.71*** 31.76*** 46.68***
(1.69) (1.02) (0.85) (0.9) (1.69)
Age < 45 1.01 0.05 -0.41 -1.12 -1.42
(1.03) (0.94) (0.78) (0.96) (1.09)
Non-Parametric IV 6.71** 25.1*** 23.7*** 20.88*** 23.67***
(2.72) (1.75) (2.96) (1.8) (3.47)
Age < 45 5.4 1.45 -0.66 2.99 5.76
(3.49) (2.64) (3.43) (2.34) (4.04)
Dynan 7.67*** 19.13*** 26.24*** 27.42*** 22.18***
(1.45) (1.48) (1.45) (1.4) (1.37)
Age < 45 -0.64 -0.64 -0.64 -0.64 -0.64
(1.17) (1.17) (1.17) (1.17) (1.17)
1. Sample Size: 6444 Households
2. Standard errors based on 999 bootstrap replications
3. ***p ¡ 0.01, **p ¡ 0.05, *p ¡ 0.1
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Table 2.9: Predicted Median Saving Rate at Different Quintiles of Predicted Long-
Run Income, proxied by “Restaurant Expenditures”, 1996.
τ = 0.1 τ = 0.3 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.7 τ = 0.9
Control Variate 1.16 11.29*** 17.73*** 24.68*** 35.35***
(1.04) (0.85) (0.81) (0.83) (1.06)
Age < 45 1.31 1.6 2.14** 2.39** 2.6**
(1) (1.04) (1.07) (1.05) (1.08)
Control Function -4.28*** 11.62*** 22.82*** 32.73*** 44.33***
(1.38) (1.12) (0.97) (1.06) (1.56)
Age < 45 0.25 0.08 -0.88 -2.6** -3.26**
(1.09) (1.01) (1.01) (1.08) (1.49)
Non-Parametric IV 7.52*** 23.89*** 23.29*** 22.55*** 25.53***
(2.69) (1.62) (2.26) (1.83) (3.73)
Age < 45 4.66 3.05 1.6 1.01 1.49
(3.62) (2.31) (2.72) (2.51) (4.19)
Dynan 12.19*** 18.23*** 23.4*** 27.61*** 20.81***
(1.86) (1.66) (1.49) (1.68) (1.54)
Age < 45 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1
(1.21) (1.21) (1.21) (1.21) (1.21)
1. Sample Size: 6444 Households
2. Standard errors based on 999 bootstrap replications
3. ***p ¡ 0.01, **p ¡ 0.05, *p ¡ 0.1
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Table 2.10: Predicted Median Saving Rate at Different Quintiles of Predicted Long-
Run Income, proxied by “Food and Clothing Expenditures”, 1996.
τ = 0.1 τ = 0.3 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.7 τ = 0.9
Control Variate 3.06*** 11.22*** 16.54*** 23.45*** 40.96***
(1.07) (0.99) (0.94) (0.89) (1.24)
Age < 45 2.32** 1.91 1.43 1.51 1.58
(1.15) (1.23) (1.25) (1.29) (1.2)
Control Function -6.18*** 10.22*** 21.33*** 32.93*** 49.08***
(1.94) (0.85) (0.91) (0.88) (1.64)
Age < 45 -0.1 0.84 0.05 -0.9 -0.75
(1.08) (0.93) (0.94) (1.02) (1.12)
Non-Parametric IV 8.18*** 25.97*** 21.68*** 19.69*** 24.54***
(2.18) (1.92) (1.84) (1.49) (1.96)
Age < 45 5.76* 1.44 -0.8 2.8 6.31*
(3.25) (2.51) (2.65) (2.05) (3.35)
Dynan 7.41*** 19.24*** 27.31*** 24.11*** 23.27***
(1.63) (1.55) (1.51) (1.34) (1.62)
Age < 45 -0.62 -0.62 -0.62 -0.62 -0.62
(1.26) (1.26) (1.26) (1.26) (1.26)
1. Sample Size: 6444 Households
2. Standard errors based on 999 bootstrap replications
3. ***p ¡ 0.01, **p ¡ 0.05, *p ¡ 0.1
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Table 2.11: Predicted Median Saving Rate at Different Quintiles of Predicted Long-
Run Income, proxied by “Total Consumption”, 1996.
τ = 0.1 τ = 0.3 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.7 τ = 0.9
Control Variate 5.65*** 10.03*** 14.29*** 24.39*** 50.94***
(1.21) (1) (0.78) (0.78) (1.32)
Age < 45 1.96* 2.5** 2.45*** 1.63* -0.2
(1.04) (1.09) (0.94) (0.88) (0.98)
Control Function -18.39*** 1.68 16.01*** 32.31*** 60.07***
(1.82) (1.28) (0.88) (1.24) (2.32)
Age < 45 2.51** 1.16 -0.39 -1.82 -5.18***
(1.17) (1.12) (0.99) (1.15) (1.77)
Non-Parametric IV 10.04*** 27.02*** 25.08*** 16.85*** 17.69***
(1.95) (2.5) (3.19) (2.03) (3.62)
Age < 45 4.36 2.96 -1.33 3.59 6.05
(2.92) (3.33) (3.79) (2.81) (4.38)
Dynan 7.85*** 24.63*** 27.25*** 25.72*** 16.71***
(1.37) (1.85) (1.45) (1.7) (1.81)
Age < 45 -0.69 -0.69 -0.69 -0.69 -0.69
(1.15) (1.15) (1.15) (1.15) (1.15)
1. Sample Size: 6444 Households
2. Standard errors based on 999 bootstrap replications
3. ***p ¡ 0.01, **p ¡ 0.05, *p ¡ 0.1
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Chapter 3
Aggregate Determinants of
Household Insolvency across
Canadian Provinces, A Panel-VAR
Approach
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3.1 Introduction
Almost every quarter since the early 1990s, Canadians have experienced a new high
record in their debt levels. It became more concerning when the debt-to-disposable
income ratio approached the level similar to the level in the US when the recent great
recession started in 2007. Debt-to-disposable income in that time was about 160%
in the US. In 1990, the debt-to-disposable income ratio for Canadian households was
98% , while in the first quarter of 2016 the ratio was 165.3%.1 This means that for
every dollar of disposable income, households owed 1.65 dollars in debt. Accordingly,
various policy institutions have raised concerns about increased levels of household
debt. While some researchers claim that Canada is in the same amount of risk as the
US in pre-recession period, others argue that Canadian households’ net worth has
risen and higher levels of debt are associated with higher gains in assets and income.
Overall, credit is a new tool and with the expansion of financial markets, bor-
rowing against future income has become easier and easier. There is not enough
historical observation to determine how much debt is considered good, or what the
optimized level of debt is for households based on their demographic and financial
characteristics. Confronting this issue is beyond the scope of this article. However,
we try to address one of the side-effects of this phenomenon which is the increased
number of insolvent households.
The ability to borrow against the future flow of income can boost current ag-
gregate demand and lead to faster growth through higher current consumption ex-
penditure. However, increased levels of debt make households more vulnerable and
in the case of an adverse income shock, households will fall into bankruptcy easier.
Historical data from Canada depicted in Figure.3.1 shows the cyclical co-movements
–Deviation from the long-run trend– of the insolvency rate and debt to disposable
income ratio. This can be seen in Figure.3.1 in national level and in Figure.3.6 in
provincial levels. As levels of debt have increased in the past two decades, the cor-
1CANSIM Table 380-0073.
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relation between unemployment rate and insolvency rate has also increased.
In Figure.3.7 We can see the negative correlation of insolvency rate and log GDP
at provincial levels. Using national, provincial data and household level data in
Canada, Fieldhouse et al. (2012) investigates the key factors that affect cyclical
movements of consumer insolvency rate. They explore both demand and supply side
and count adverse income shocks, and unemployment fluctuations, the main factor
on the demand side. On the supply side, tightened standards for lending as well as
the higher interest rate for riskier borrowers, makes it more costly for households to
access credit and rollover existing debts. Using micro-level data, they provide de-
mographic information on households who file bankruptcy or proposal such as age,
marital status, household size, and income level.
Similarly, Garrett and Wall (2010) documents the relationship between the un-
employment rate and personal bankruptcy using state-level data from the US. They
find a countercyclical pattern in bankruptcy, and bankruptcy filing peaks close to
the end of the recession and tends to decline slowly after the recession.
Using the Survey of Financial Security in Canada, MacGee (2012) draws compar-
isons between insolvency rate in the United States and Canada and concludes that
“current levels of consumer debt offer cause for concern, but not panic”. He suggests
that in the most likely scenario, household debt levels must remain manageable, yet
these high levels of debt make Canadian households susceptible to significant nega-
tive shocks that might result in a higher interest rate or lower income.
Meh et al. (2009) also uses Survey of Financial Security and investigates house-
hold debt in Canada. One of the key findings of this study is that between 1999 to
2005, the sensitivity of households to negative income shocks, interest rate changes
and especially housing market movements, due to higher share of mortgages in the
household budget, has increased significantly. It is suggested that due to higher debt
to income ratio and generally higher debt burden, households in lower income brack-
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ets must be monitored more cautiously.
Livshits et al. (2015) in a DSGE model with a heterogeneous agent life-cycle an
competitive financial intermediaries, finds that income uncertainty and adverse in-
come shock alone cannot explain the rise in the bankruptcy rate in the US. Instead,
they purport that this is a reflection of changes in financial market environments.
They show that a lower cost of lending and decline in the cost of bankruptcy has
had a large contribution to the rise in consumer bankruptcy rate.
The effects of economic recessions on household financial stability is studied by
Jakub´ık (2014). In a macro model with a small open economy, representing a Euro-
pean economy, he asserts that a significant additional decline in consumer consump-
tion is observed in recessions, which is a result of higher household insolvency and
default rate. The key finding is that the insolvency rate greatly matters in policy
implications for the financial section and cyclical fluctuations of the macroeconomy.
In this study, our final goal is to investigate the effects and consequences of higher
financial vulnerability of households –as measured by insolvency rate– on the cyclical
behavior of GDP. In other words we want to draw connections between the cyclical
behavior of Insolvency rate and GDP across provinces, while controlling for other
related variables.
As Figure.3.2 shows cyclical movements of insolvency rate and unemployment rate
are strongly correlated. This correlation is shown at provincial level in Figure.3.6,
and it can be seen that the insolvency rate rise and fall behind the unemployment
rate. On the other hand we know that both variables are highly correlated with
GDP. Common sense suggests that GDP growth reduces both the unemployment
rate and the insolvency rate. Our main hypothesis is that higher levels of debt that
are associated with increased financial instability of households, have a negative im-
pact on the GDP.
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Figure 3.1: National Insolvency rate and Debt to Disposable Income Ratio, Deviation
from Long-run Trend.
In our analysis, we also consider the effect of income inequality on financial vul-
nerability of households. If higher levels of inequality are associated with higher
insolvency rates, it can be evidence for trickle down consumption theory and con-
spicuous consumption hypothesis. This can be explained when middle class and
low income families seek a higher economic or social status through borrowing and
spending money on luxury goods and services.
Insolvency rate in Canada is depicted in Figure.3.3. It had been quite constant
from 1997 to 2007 just less than 4 per 1000 population, and increased by 50% during
the 2008 recession to nearly 6 per 1000 population. We use panel regression analysis
and Panel Vector Autoregression analysis to test our hypotheses and investigate the
relationship between financial stability of households and GDP. We use panel regres-
sion analysis to find out the related variables to insolvency rate, in order to control
for them in our panel-VAR model. Our findings show that unemployment rate, debt-
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to-disposable income ratio, housing price index and consumer loan interest rate have
positive effect on insolvency rate. on the other hand, GDP and non-housing prices
are negatively correlated with insolvency rate. From the results of panel vector auto
regression, we find that insolvency rate has a small, yet significant effect on cyclical
movements of GDP.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The ext section provides a brief
description of the datasets used in this study. Following the dataset description
section.4 provides empirical methodology and results of our analysis and finally Sec-
tion.5 will conclude with a discussion.
3.2 Aggregate Data
In the case of insolvency, Canadian Households have two options. First, they can file
for bankruptcy that requires liquidating assets and as a result, unsecured debt will
be written off. Secured debt remains in place, and they have to pay their mortgage
payments. Other options for filing bankruptcy include, filing a proposal to destruct
debt, called devision II proposal. If the majority of creditors approve the proposal,
repayment of debt will be restructured. We investigate cyclical movements of the
insolvency rate at the provincial level, that is define as the number of insolvent house-
holds per 1000 population in that Province. These data span the time period from
1987 to 2014 and are available on an annual basis.2
In a series of analyses, several variables are taken into account that are considered
to have an effect on insolvency rate or are affected by insolvency rate fluctuations. In
particular, we consider cyclical movements of GDP, its growth rate, unemployment
rate, housing prices and non-housing prices. Since we intend to focus on the cyclical
behavior of these variables, the Hodrick-Prescott filter is used to detrend aggregate
2Available at Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy Canada
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variables and calculate the deviation from long-run trend. All the data are collected
from the Statistics Canada website.
Different panel unit root tests are performed to ensure the stationarity of vari-
ables. Based on Im-Pesran-Shin, Levin-Lin-Shin and Bruiting unit root tests that
test for stationarity of panel data, our detrended series are not integrated and all are
stationarity.
3.3 Empirical Results
3.3.1 Simple Correlation Analysis
Before starting regression analysis, we report the contemporaneous and lagged cor-
relation between variables of interest to have a better sense of the shape of the rela-
tionship between these variables. Table.3.1 shows the contemporaneous and lagged
correlation between all the variables. Unemployment rate has a strong positive cor-
relation with the insolvency rate. The first lag of the unemployment rate also has a
positive and smaller correlation, however, the second lag has a strongly negative cor-
relation with the insolvency rate. This can be interpreted as higher unemployment
has strong positive effect on insolvency rate at the current period, while the effects
of shocks to unemployment rate have negative effect on insolvency rate in next two
periods.
Contemporaneous GDP and its first lag are negatively correlated, and the second
lag is weakly positively correlated. The first lag of the housing prices has a stronger
positive correlation with the insolvency rate than the contemporaneous and other
lags. Meaning shocks to housing prices from last period have a stronger effect on the
insolvency rate in the current period.
Non-housing prices are negatively correlated, and higher lags have a stronger
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negative correlation. At the end, we also consider the relationship between the Gini
coefficient and the insolvency rate. Surprisingly it has a fairly strong positive cor-
relation with the insolvency rate. This means that higher levels of inequality are
associated with a higher insolvency rate.
3.3.2 Panel Regression Analysis
We begin our empirical analysis by a series of random effect panel regressions. The
general specification is shown in Equation.3.1. We regress the provincial insolvency
rate on the unemployment rate, log GDP, housing prices, non-housing prices, and the
debt-to-disposable income ratio as well as provincial Gini coefficient. Based on the
results of the Hauman test, the random effect model is the appropriate approach.
Using Hedrick-Prescott filter, all variables are detrended and defined in deviation
from long-run trend due to our focus on cyclical movements in these variables.
INScit = α0+α1URcit+α2logGDPcit+α3HPcit+α4NHPcit+α5GINIcit+α6DDIcit+it
(3.1)
Results of a selection of specifications are reported in Table.3.2. For the matter
of convenience of interpretation, Gini Coefficient is defined in a scale of zero to 100,
instead of zero to one. It has a positive significant effect on the insolvency rate. Any
point increase in Gini coefficient, is associated with an 0.1 increase in the insolvency
rate. As we add a second lag of unemployment and log GDP, its effect reduces to
almost half.
The effect of debt-to-disposable income ratio is quite consistent across different
specifications. It has a strong and consistently significant positive effect. With every
dollar increase in the debt-to-disposable income ratio, the insolvency rate increases
by 0.03. Since 1990, the debt-to-disposable income has increased from 89.3 to 165.3
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in 2016. According to our analyses, the pure effect of this increase has been about
2.3 increase in the insolvency rate.
Housing price index and non-housing prices have different effects on the insol-
vency rate. Even though common sense suggests that higher house prices have a
positive wealth effect and should reduce insolvency rate, our findings prove other-
wise and shows a positive relationship between housing prices and insolvency rate.
This is consistent with findings of other researchers in the literature.3 The effect
of non-housing price index is significant and negative. This is consistent with the
findings in the first chapter. Higher prices of core items, tightens households budget
and forces more careful spending.
The coefficient of provincial unemployment rate is very consistent and significant
across different specifications. Log GDP has the largest effect on the insolvency rate.
Consistent with our expectations, log GDP has a negative effect on insolvency rate
and with every 1% growth in gross domestic product, the insolvency rate decreases
by about 5.5 units. Adding the consumer loan rate to the model, does not have any
significant effect on other coefficients, while it increases the R2 significantly. How-
ever the housing price index coefficient decreases and becomes insignificant. Higher
interest rates are associated with a higher insolvency rate.
In various specifications that we consider, in addition to contemporaneous unem-
ployment rate and contemporaneous log GDP, based on overall R2 and significance
level, we consider the second lag of the unemployment rate and log GDP as well.
They are both statistically significant and help improve the prediction power of the
model. At the end, we consider the contemporaneous effect of housing prices and
non-housing prices, and by adding them to the model, even though they are both
insignificant, the first lag of housing prices turns significant.
In Table.3.3 we add two dummy variables for two major recessions that occurred
in Canada in early 1991 and in 2008. Across different specifications, two dummies
are signifiant, and positive. The key result is the coefficient of 2008 recession is much
larger, specially in specifications (1) and (2), that is before controlling for debt level.
This difference expresses the effect of higher levels of debt on financial stability of
households in recessions.
3See Fieldhouse et al. (2012).
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Table 3.2: Dependent Variable: Provincial Insolvency Rate.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gini Coefficient 0.100*** 0.0917*** 0.0526* 0.0547**
(3.62) (3.35) (1.9) (1.97)
Debt to Disposable 0.0285*** 0.0308*** 0.0320*** 0.0340***
Income Ratio (3.31) (3.62) (3.87) (3.95)
Unemployment Rate 0.131*** 0.132*** 0.135*** 0.125***
(3.5) (3.59) (3.79) (3.41)
log GDP -4.890*** -5.549*** -6.423*** -6.097***
(-4.31) (-4.88) (-5.67) (-5.20)
House Price Index L1 0.0357** 0.0249 0.0222 0.0402*
(2.01) (1.4) (1.19) (1.82)
Non Housing Prices L1 -0.113*** -0.110*** -0.0959*** -0.0998***
(-5.04) (-4.97) (-4.45) (-3.71)
Consumer Loan Rate 0.0325*** 0.0236** 0.0290**
(3.08) (2.25) (2.39)
Unemployment Rate L2 -0.159*** -0.155***
(-4.79) (-4.64)
log GDP L2 -2.462** -2.097*
(-2.03) (-1.69)
Housing Prices -0.0322
(-1.56)
Non-Housing Prices 0.016
(0.56)
Overall R2 0.307 0.331 0.384 0.389
Within R2 0.307 0.331 0.384 0.39
Between R2 0.190 0.111 0.0293 0.0048
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 3.3: Dependent Variable: Provincial Insolvency Rate.
(1) (2) (3) (3)
Gini Coefficient 0.0713*** 0.0709*** 0.0451* 0.0477*
(2.8) (2.79) (1.74) (1.83)
Unemployment Rate 0.126*** 0.131*** 0.130*** 0.118***
(3.71) (3.84) (3.89) (3.46)
log GDP -4.080*** -4.270*** -5.389*** -5.048***
(-4.08) (-4.25) (-5.04) (-4.58)
House Price Index L1 0.00314 -0.00185 -0.000541 0.0194
(0.19) (-0.11) (-0.03) (0.92)
Non Housing Prices L1 -0.101*** -0.0986*** -0.0850*** -0.0915***
(-4.96) (-4.87) (-4.20) (-3.55)
1991 Recession 0.470*** 0.357*** 0.348*** 0.345**
(4.57) ( 2.82) (2.79) ( 2.49)
2008 Recession 0.925*** 0.940*** 0.692*** 0.700***
(7.5) (7.63) (5.96) (5.87)
Consumer Loan Rate 0.0183 0.0135 0.0191
(1.52) (1.13) (1.53)
Debt to Disposable 0.0159* 0.0182**
Income Ratio (1.94) (2.18)
Unemployment Rate L2 -0.118*** -0.113***
(-3.72) (-3.56)
log GDP L2 -2.496** -2.109*
(-2.20) (-1.82)
Housing Prices -0.0357*
(-1.85)
Non-Housing Prices 0.0218
(0.73)
OverallR2 0.430 0.435 0.468 0.475
Within R2 0.430 0.435 0.468 0.475
BetweenR2 0.0528 0.0318 0.0988 0.059
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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3.3.3 Panel Vector Autoregressive Analysis
In this section, using a Panel-VAR approach, we investigate the relationship between
the insolvency rate and GDP in Canada. In panel regression analysis, in the previ-
ous section, we saw the effect of several variables on the insolvency rate. In a more
dynamic approach, we want to explore the interrelation of the insolvency rate and
GDP to see if insolvency rate has any effect on cyclical movements of GDP. The
general framework of the model is as in Equation.3.2.
[
INScit
lGDPcit
]
= Γ
[
INScit−1
lGDPcit−1
]
+ ΨXit +
[
1it
2it
]
(3.2)
This specification represents a panel vector autoregressive of order one, PVAR(1),
Γ is a 2x2 matrix of autoregressive coefficients, and Ψ is a 2xk matrix, where k is
the number of exogenous variables. Xt is a kx1 vector of exogenous variables and in-
cludes; unemployment rate, housing prices, non-housing prices, Gini coefficient, and
consumer loan rate. We investigate their effect on both insolvency rate and log GDP.
All variables are detrended and are defined as deviation from long-run trend.
In order to avoid any co-integration issue, and to make sure the system is station-
ary, different panel unit root tests such as “Levin-Lin-Chu”, “Im-Pesaran-Shin”, and
“Harris-Tzavalis” unit-root test have been applied. All variables in their detrended
version are proved to be stationary and no evidence of unit root was found. Sum-
mary of unit root tests are reported in Appendix.3.4.
Results of the estimation of (3.2) are reported in Table.3.4. The optimal lag
order is chosen based on BIC and AIC criteria. As it is expected, log GDP has
a negative effect on the insolvency rate and the same results for the unemployment
rate. Consistent with our analysis in the panel regression section, housing prices
have a positive effect on the insolvency rate, while higher non-housing prices reduce
insolvency rate. However, Gini coefficient and debt-to-disposable income ratio do
not have any significant effect on the insolvency rate.
The main result from this set of analyses is the negative coefficient of the lag
insolvency rate in the GDP equation. It is small, yet significant and conveys the
message that higher insolvency rate –higher rates of the vulnerability of households–
lowers the GDP growth rate. This is best seen in the impulse response function de-
rived from this estimation in Figure.3.4. The IRF shows that with a one-time shock
125
Table 3.4: Panel Vector Autoregressive Estimation
Coef. Std.Err. z P<z [95% Conf. Interval]
Insolv Rate
Insolv Rate
L1. 0.3876*** 0.0638 6.08 0.000 0.2625 0.5127
log GDP
L1. -2.5417* 1.5143 -1.68 0.093 -5.509 0.4264
Unemployment 0.1323*** 0.0436 3.03 0.002 0.04682 0.2178
Unemployment L2 -0.1500*** 0.0410 -3.65 0.000 -0.2305 -0.0695
HP L1 0.0500** 0.0246 2.03 0.043 0.0016 0.0984
NHP L1 -0.0816*** 0.0217 -3.75 0.000 -0.1243 -0.0389
Gini Coeff 0.0392 0.0300 1.31 0.191 -0.0196 0.0980
Debt to Income 0.0167 0.0104 1.59 0.111 -0.0038 0.0372
Cons Loan Rate 0.0015 0.0163 0.09 0.925 -0.0305 0.0336
log GDP
Insolv Rate
L1. -0.0123*** 0.0036 -3.34 0.001 -0.0195 -0.0050
log GDP
L1. 0.5736*** 0.0755 7.59 0.000 0.42554 0.7218
Unemployment -0.0084*** 0.0017 -4.79 0.000 -0.0119 -0.0049
Unemployment L2 0.0001 0.0017 0.08 0.937 -0.0033 0.0036
HP L1 0.0004 0.0011 0.40 0.691 -0.0018 0.0020
NHP L1 -0.0003 0.001 -0.27 0.784 -0.0025 0.0019
Gini Coeff 0.0014 0.0017 0.86 0.390 -0.0018 0.0048
Debt to Income 0.0008 0.0004 1.62 0.106 -0.0001 0.0017
Cons Loan Rate 0.0008 0.0008 1.04 0.296 -0.0007 0.0020
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to insolvency rate, one unit increase only for one period, reduces the log GDP for
about 1.2% in the following period and it takes the system about 15 periods that the
effect of this shock is fully eliminated.
On the other hand, the effect of a one-time shock to log GDP on insolvency rate
is much larger and it reduces the insolvency rate by about 2.5 units and the effect
diminishes and disappears after about 15 periods. This IRF is shown in Figure.3.5.
Other than unemployment rate, none of the exogenous variables have any significant
effect on the log GDP.
3.4 Summary
In this article, we studied the relationship of several aggregate variables with financial
stability of households, at the provincial level. We used panel data of the provincial
consumer insolvency rate as a measure of financial vulnerability, and investigated
the effect of income inequality, household debt-to-income ratio, log GDP and unem-
ployment rate on the number of insolvent households per year.
Consistently from both panel regression analysis and panel vector autoregression
analysis, we observed a negative effect from log GDP and housing price index on
Households’ insolvency rate, while the effect of unemployment rate, income inequal-
ity, consumer loan interest rate and household debt-to-income ratio is positive. The
key finding of this study is the negative impact of higher insolvency rate on log GDP.
Our empirical results show that a higher insolvency rate has a negative impact on
GDP and it lowers the growth rate of GDP in future periods.
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Figure 3.4: Response of Insolvency Rate to a one time positive shock to GDP
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Figure 3.5: Response of GDP to a one time positive shock to Insolvency Rate
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Unit Root Tests
log GDP
Table 5: Im-Pesaran-Shin unit-root test for detrended log GDP
Ho: All panels contain unit
roots
Number of panels = 10
Ha: Some panels are stationary Number of periods = 28
AR parameter: Panel-specific Asymptotics: T,N - Infinity
Panel means: Included sequentially
Time trend: Not included
Fixed-N exact critical values
Statistic p-value 1% 5% 10%
t-bar -2.6718 -2.18 -1.99 -1.88
t-tilde-bar -2.3868
Z-t-tilde-bar -3.8402 0.0001
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Table 6: Levin-Lin-Chu unit-root test for detrended log GDP
Ho: Panels contain unit roots Number of panels =10
Ha: Panels are stationary Number of periods = 28
AR parameter: Common Asymptotics: N/T = 0
Panel means: Included
Time trend: Not included
ADF regressions: 1 lag
LR variance: Bartlett kernel, 9.00 lags average (chosen by LLC)
Statistic p-value
Unadjusted t -9.8594
Adjusted t* -4.7822 0.0000
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Insolvency Rate
Table 7: Levin-Lin-Chu unit-root test for dtrended Insolvency Rate
Ho: Panels contain unit roots Number of panels = 10
Ha: Panels are stationary Number of periods = 28
AR parameter: Common Asymptotics: N/T - 0
Panel means: Included
Time trend: Not included
ADF regressions: 1 lag
LR variance: Bartlett kernel, 9.00 lags average (chosen by LLC)
Statistic p-value
Unadjusted t -15.7209
Adjusted t* -11.5975 0.0000
Table 8: Im-Pesaran-Shin unit-root test for detrended Insolvency Rate
Ho: All panels contain unit
roots
Number of panels = 10
Ha: Some panels are stationary Number of periods = 28
AR parameter: Panel-specific Asymptotics: T,N - Infinity
Panel means: Included sequentially
Time trend: Not included
Fixed-N exact critical values
Statistic p-value 1% 5% 10%
t-bar -3.1126 -2.18 -1.99 -1.88
t-tilde-bar -2.6839
Z-t-tilde-bar -5.0361 0.0000
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Unemployment Rate
Table 9: Levin-Lin-Chu unit-root test for dtrended Unemployment Rate
Ho: Panels contain unit roots Number of panels = 10
Ha: Panels are stationary Number of periods = 28
AR parameter: Common Asymptotics: N/T - 0
Panel means: Included
Time trend: Not included
ADF regressions: 1 lag
LR variance: Bartlett kernel, 9.00 lags average (chosen by LLC)
Statistic p-value
Unadjusted t -11.8527
Adjusted t* -7.7927 0.0000
Table 10: Im-Pesaran-Shin unit-root test for detrended Unemployment Rate
Ho: All panels contain unit
roots
Number of panels = 10
Ha: Some panels are stationary Number of periods = 28
AR parameter: Panel-specific Asymptotics: T,N - Infinity
Panel means: Included sequentially
Time trend: Not included
Fixed-N exact critical values
Statistic p-value 1% 5% 10%
t-bar -2.9324 -2.18 -1.99 -1.88
t-tilde-bar -2.5574
Z-t-tilde-bar -4.5269 0.0000
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Housing Price Index
Table 11: Levin-Lin-Chu unit-root test for dtrended Housing Price Index
Ho: Panels contain unit roots Number of panels = 10
Ha: Panels are stationary Number of periods = 28
AR parameter: Common Asymptotics: N/T - 0
Panel means: Included
Time trend: Not included
ADF regressions: 1 lag
LR variance: Bartlett kernel, 9.00 lags average (chosen by LLC)
Statistic p-value
Unadjusted t -11.1771
Adjusted t* -6.1495 0.0000
Table 12: Im-Pesaran-Shin unit-root test for detrended Housing Price Index
Ho: All panels contain unit
roots
Number of panels = 10
Ha: Some panels are stationary Number of periods = 28
AR parameter: Panel-specific Asymptotics: T,N - Infinity
Panel means: Included sequentially
Time trend: Not included
Fixed-N exact critical values
Statistic p-value 1% 5% 10%
t-bar -2.7875 -2.18 -1.99 -1.88
t-tilde-bar -2.4685
Z-t-tilde-bar -4.1690 0.0000
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Debt to Disposable Income Ratio
Table 13: Levin-Lin-Chu unit-root test for dtrended Debt to Disposable Income
Ratio
Ho: Panels contain unit roots Number of panels = 10
Ha: Panels are stationary Number of periods = 28
AR parameter: Common Asymptotics: N/T - 0
Panel means: Included
Time trend: Not included
ADF regressions: 1 lag
LR variance: Bartlett kernel, 9.00 lags average (chosen by LLC)
Statistic p-value
Unadjusted t -10.9708
Adjusted t* -5.3215 0.0000
Table 14: Im-Pesaran-Shin unit-root test for detrended Debt to Disposable In-
come Ratio
Ho: All panels contain unit
roots
Number of panels = 10
Ha: Some panels are stationary Number of periods = 28
AR parameter: Panel-specific Asymptotics: T,N - Infinity
Panel means: Included sequentially
Time trend: Not included
Fixed-N exact critical values
Statistic p-value 1% 5% 10%
t-bar -2.7875 -2.18 -1.99 -1.88
t-tilde-bar -2.4685
Z-t-tilde-bar -6.0135 0.0000
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